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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the effects of deployment characteristics and demographic 
data on propensity rates for developing Post-traumatic stress disorder.  The results will 
serve to identify the current trends of PTSD among sailors based on quantitative analysis 
of medical data provided by AMSA and DMDC.  It will also inform the Department of 
Defense on the potential policy implications involved in this study. 
The medical data analyzed will be provided and released from the Army Medical 
Surveillance Activity (AMSA) and DMDC will be combined by AMSA to obtain 
demographics, pre and post deployment health assessment, deployment areas, and years 
of deployment.  Participants include all Navy personnel who responded to the Post 
deployment health assessment (DD Form 2796) any time from January 1999 to 
September 2007.   
Factors having positive impacts on the propensity to develop PTSD include 
deployment characteristics like hostile deployments, deployment duration lengths and 
repeated deployments for enlisted sailors.  Officers were not affected by deployment 
lengths or repeated deployments.  Demographic factors that were significant included 
gender in both data sets and race for enlisted sailors.  For rank among the enlisted sailors 
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Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a type of anxiety disorder that is 
triggered by either a traumatic event or witnessing a traumatic event that happened to 
someone else.   PTSD has tremendous impacts on the mental stability of those involved 
in the heaviest fighting, especially in light of the current Global War on Terrorism.  In an 
effort to acknowledge this threat to the combat readiness the U.S. military has supported 
research on PTSD for the first time through the Mental Health Advisory Teams Reports 
(MHAT I-IV, 2006).  The military has also been supporting independent research through 
the RAND Corporation and other academics.   
With the continued deployments of large numbers of service members to combat 
zones in the Middle East and elsewhere, there is a continued risk for increasing rates of 
PTSD among our soldiers and sailors regardless of duty descriptions.  Data from Iraq and 
Afghanistan that can be used to determine the risk factors for PTSD is becoming more 
available for study the longer the Global War on Terror continues.  Risk assessments for 
deploying servicemen is one potential solution while limiting the number of combat tours 
seems a better, although more unlikely, option available for policy makers.   
This study will give information about the potential rates of PTSD in sailors after 
multiple deployments to Iraq or Afghanistan as well as the impact of increased tour 
lengths on those rates.  The results will serve to identify the current trends of PTSD 
among sailors based on quantitative analysis of medical data provided by AMSA and 
DMDC.  It will also inform the Department of Defense on the potential policy 





B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is to analyze the effect of repeated deployment and 
other deployment characteristics on the rate of PTSD among Navy personnel.  Secondary 
questions include: 
• Determine the frequency of PTSD among those U.S. Navy personnel who serve 
longer tour lengths than those with shorter tours. 
 
• Identify other potential risk factors for PTSD based on demographic and service 
characteristics. 
 
• Identify policy implications for the Department of Defense due to these risk 
factors for PTSD after combat deployments. 
C.  STUDY OVERVIEW   
There will be two main sections to the body of this thesis.  The first section will 
be a review of the history as well as the current literature on post-traumatic stress 
disorder among combat veterans.  The focus will be on historical treatment of mental 
disorders among veterans, the effect of continued exposure to combat conditions as well 
as the current data that has been gathered on Operation Iraqi Freedom / Operation 
Enduring Freedom veterans.  This review will also include demographics as well as 
initial findings and conclusions about rates of PTSD among veterans.  The second section 
of the thesis will provide a quantitative analysis of naval personnel and effects of longer 
tours of duty in the combat zone.  The medical data analyzed will be provided and 
released from the Army Medical Surveillance Activity (AMSA) and DMDC will be 
combined by AMSA to obtain demographics, pre and post deployment health assessment, 
deployment areas, and years of deployment.  Participants include all Navy personnel who 
responded to the Post deployment health assessment (DD Form 2796) any time from 
January 1999 to September 2007.  Data from AMSA provides mental health information 
of the respondents to DD Form 2796.  Data from DMDC provides demographic and 
deployment history of the respondents.   All observations will be merged by AMSA.  The 
thesis will specifically focus on looking to study those patients identified as having 
received an ICD-9 Code of 309.81 (PTSD).   
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The main empirical strategy for this thesis will be a nonlinear regression model to 
determine whether multiple independent variables such as extended tour lengths and 
demographics have a positive or negative sign and what magnitude they have on the 
dependent variable of rates of post-traumatic stress disorder.  Causality will not be the 
focus.  Instead the analysis will be on the relationship that results when all other factors 
are held constant.     
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
 The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II provides Background on 
PTSD and Literature Review. Chapter III describes the psychological aspects of killing 
and combat with the intent of explaining significant differences in the propensity of naval 
personnel to develop PTSD compared to Army and Marine Corps veterans in the data set.  
Chapter IV will discuss the summary statistics from our data set.  Chapter V lays out the 
detailed empirical methodology. Chapter VI presents results from the data analysis.  
Chapter VII provides the conclusion and recommendations. Within each of these sections 
there is a brief synopsis of the chapter’s relevance to the thesis as a whole. This 
additional material will enable each chapter to stand alone.  The Background chapter 
offers a brief summary of the evolution of mental health / PTSD treatment throughout our 
Nation’s history with particular emphasis on Army veterans due to the lack of 
information on PTSD within the Navy.  It ends with a section detailing current military 
policy regarding PTSD.  The Literature Review chapter offers a further analysis on the 
various MHAT studies done by the Unites States Army in order to access trends among 
veterans regarding PTSD as well as several other early studies done on PTSD, to include 
one from the Vietnam War.  The Data Set chapter will look at the data being examined 
from AMSA and summary statistics.  The Methodology chapter will focus on the 
econometric model specifications and the logistic regressions used in the analysis.  The 
results chapter will focus on the statistical significance of our model and look at the 
various findings.  The final chapter will focus on the conclusions and recommendations 
based on the analysis.  
  4
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From shell shock to battle fatigue in past conflicts to post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) today the combat experiences of our military is horrendous and has 
tremendous impacts on the mental stability of those involved in the heaviest fighting.  In 
an effort to acknowledge this threat to the combat readiness the U.S. military has 
supported research on PTSD for the first time through the Mental Health Advisory Teams 
Reports (MHAT I-IV, 2006).  The military has also been supporting independent research 
through several research institutions.   
In this chapter we will first review the background of PTSD, starting with the 
clinical definition of PTSD and the criteria used to classify it.  This section will also look 
at the specific effects on combat veterans, both in present times and in historical settings.  
The next section will discuss the protocols currently available to manage the effects of 
this disease, and specifically look at the potential policy implications involved.  The 
following section will look at historical examples of PTSD in United States military 
history, from the Civil War to Vietnam.  Current policy regarding PTSD will then be 
discussed with examples from both the Army and the Navy.  We will complete this 
chapter by looking at recent studies conducted with data from the Global War on Terror 
(both Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as looking at barriers to care that were identified in 
an American Psychiatric Association (APA) study. 
B. BACKGROUND ON PTSD 
1. Clinical Definition and Prevalence of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a type of anxiety disorder that is 
triggered by either a traumatic event or witnessing a traumatic event that happened to 
someone else.  To be diagnosed with PTSD, the patient must meet criteria spelled out in 
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the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). This manual is 
published by the American Psychiatric Association and is used by mental health 
professionals to diagnose mental conditions.  For post-traumatic stress disorder to be 
diagnosed, several criteria must be met, including but not limited to: 
 
• Experience or witness an event that involved death or serious injury  
• Response to the event involved intense fear, horror or a sense of helplessness  
• Reliving experiences of the event, such as having distressing memories, 
upsetting dreams, flashbacks or even physical reactions  
• Avoidance of situations that remind the patient of the traumatic event  
• Hyper awareness (i.e. feel constantly on guard or alert for danger, which may 
cause trouble sleeping)  
• Symptoms last longer than a month  
• The symptoms interfere with the patient’s ability to go about his/her daily 
tasks  
 
The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems (most commonly known by the abbreviation ICD) provides codes to classify 
diseases as well as identifying signs, symptoms, abnormal findings, and external causes 
of injury or disease.  The diagnostic code of PTSD in ICD-9 is 309.81.  Recognizing this 
code is critical for this research, as we identify servicemen with PTSD using this specific 
code as determined by data on the Post Deployment Health Assessment. 
Wars and the traumatic events witnessed by the military are an acknowledged 
leading cause for the large number of veterans who suffer from PTSD (King, D. W., 
King, L. A., Foy, D. W., Keane, T. M., & Fairbank, J. A., 1999; Riggs, D., Byrne, C.A., 
Weathers, F.W. & Litz, B.T., 1998).  The severity of PTSD among Vietnam veterans in 
particular has been widely studied and the effects have been documented (National 
Coalition for Homeless Veterans, 2007), including: 
 
• Significant number of Vietnam veterans have committed suicide with 
estimates ranging from 20,000 to 150,000 although precise numbers are 
impossible to gather due to various factors 
• 33 percentage points of adult homeless are veterans with 47 percentage points 
serving in the Vietnam War Era 
• 45 percentage points suffer from mental illness  
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The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are the longest sustained military operations 
since the Vietnam War.  A significant portion of this new generation of combat veterans 
now face the reality of suffering chronic PTSD based on the high levels of stress involved 
in combat operations as well as the intensity of combat for our deployed troops.  The 
rates of PTSD from an early study done indicated that the estimated risk for posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) from service in the Iraq War for U.S. Army and Marine Corps 
veterans was 18 percentage points, and the estimated risk for PTSD from the Afghanistan 
mission for this same population was 11 percentage points (Hoge et al., 2004).  Since 
then the additional factors of repeated deployments and increased tour lengths, especially 
among Army personnel, have only increased these rates (MHAT Studies I-IV, 2004-
2006).  Another cause for concern is the fact that PTSD often manifests itself long after 
the events occurred and veterans redeploy home.   
There is evidence that once veterans develop military-related PTSD their 
symptoms remain chronic across the lifespan and are resistant to treatments that have 
been shown to work with other forms of chronic PTSD. As a result it is vitally important 
to provide early intervention to reduce the risk of chronic impairment in veterans. 
However, there are troubling initial signs that soldiers from the all-volunteer professional 
military are reluctant to seek help or that help may not be readily available to them. For 
example, Hoge et al. (2004) found that although approximately 80 percentage points of 
Iraq and Afghanistan soldiers who had a serious mental health disorder acknowledged 
that they had a problem only approximately 40 percentage points stated that they were 
interested in receiving help and only 26 percentage points reported receiving formal 
mental health care.  This is a critical cause for concern as the continuing perceptions of 
stigma being attached to those identified with mental health issues is preventing treatment 
in many cases.  This is troubling news for not only the individuals but has implications 
for their future interactions in society as well.   
2. Disease Management of PTSD 
There is not a simple cure or effective treatment for PTSD except through therapy 
and medication to minimize the symptoms.  Chronic PTSD is a serious disorder that must 
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be taken into account by policy makers with regard to the combat readiness of the 
fighting force.  This study’s intent is to show the propensity of U.S. Navy personnel to 
develop PTSD as well as discuss policy implications of repeated deployments and 
extended tour lengths on the mental health and hence the combat readiness of our sailors.  
Chronic PTSD rates among our combat veterans needs to be further addressed by the 
Department of Defense and the Office of the Surgeon General prior to military members 
leaving the service and becoming further statistics for suicide and homelessness.     
Mismanagement of this issue could cause great harm to the U.S. military and their 
families.  Therefore, with the data gathered from DMDC and AMSA we propose to study 
United States Navy service members who have deployed during the Global War on 
Terror timeframe (2003-2007) in order to estimate the prevalence of PTSD rates with 
regard to deployment frequency and tour lengths, and assess risk factors for PTSD and 
discuss policy implications for the U.S. military in the future.  There is evidence in 
previous literature that we should expect PTSD rates among sailors to be much lower 
than either soldiers or marines.  Evidence to explain this difference will be discussed in 
the next chapter which discusses the psychological and sociological aspects of combat 
prior to an examination of our data sets.  
3. PTSD Historical Examples 
As the understanding of psychological stresses on the combat soldier have 
increased among the medical community there has been more effort to identify it and, 
even more recently, apply preventative measures to lessen the impact on deploying 
soldiers and their families.  This stress among fighting men is not a new phenomenon.  
The reaction of personnel to the carnage of combat has been recognized since Ancient 
times.  However, as understanding and knowledge has grown over the centuries it still 
remains an area of concern due to the lack of outward physical wounds, lack of 
understanding by peers and family and the machismo that pervades most armies, ancient 




a. American Civil War 
The American Civil War brought new horrors to the battlefield and 
imposed a higher level of psychological stress among combatants than previous conflicts.  
Widely considered as the first modern war, the Civil War produced new technology 
which extended the killing ranges of small arms and made cannon fire even more deadly 
than before.  While killing became more efficient the care of the wounded soldiers 
remained primitive in the extreme.  The practice of modern medicine was in its infancy 
and explanations for non-visible wounds were absent (Marlowe, 2001).  
During this time period American society had much simpler expectations 
of how soldiers should behave.  As such, soldiers were characterized as being either 
brave or cowardly (McPherson, 1997).  This provided few options to soldiers who were 
suffering from mental disorders like PTSD.  To many the only option available was either 
desertion or claiming physical illness.  Many of the acknowledged reactions to combat 
stress are documented throughout diaries and manuscripts from the era.  “Stragglers” in 
particular, seemed to be the catch all phrase for those soldiers who, according to Marlowe 
(2001), 
…were described as sitting under trees, trembling, clutching their 
rifles, staring into the middle distance, jumping at any loud noise—
the startle response that is today usually considered diagnostic of a 
combat stress reaction.  They were described as incapable of any 
kind of proximate effective soldierly behavior until swept up by 
the provost guards, noncommissioned officers, or officers; 
organized; and brought back into their encampments. 
 
When the Civil War ended any progress towards understanding the stress 
of modern warfare was soon forgotten by not only the medical community but society as 
well.  Many veterans chose not to talk about their experiences and instead either 
reintegrated into society or, as many did, retreat into alcohol as a way to forget.  Silence 
has often been one of the main reactions to combat stress.  The veteran finds that the 
civilian version of war is not the same carnage that was the veteran’s reality.  Anger and 
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frustration abound because non-veterans just do not understand the barbarism of war.  It 
thus becomes much safer to simply say nothing and avoid the feelings. 
b. World War II 
Having forgotten the lessons from World War I and other previous 
conflicts, the United States military in the early 1940’s believed that with selective 
service anyone with a predisposition to mental breakdowns should and would be 
“selected out” with the thought-process being that this would save the taxpayers millions 
of dollars in psychiatric services later on.  Only those identified as being without mental 
weaknesses would be allowed to serve.  This screening process began during the 
induction phase and continued through basic combat training and advanced training up 
until the soldiers shipped overseas and went into combat.  Instructors and other cadre 
were tasked with identifying any recruits with potential mental disorders and eliminated 
from service.  This approach obviously was subjective and the need for increasing 
numbers of soldiers often overshadowed any mental health issues noted.  Of course, even 
the most confident supporters of this policy anticipated that it would only catch fifty 
percent of soldiers who would ultimately have mental breakdowns from the stress of 
combat (Marlowe, 2001).   
Once major combat operations began for U.S. forces this reliance on 
screening and selective service quickly lost its central focus and support when men 
repeatedly exposed to long periods of combat, whether in the Pacific or in North Africa, 
began showing signs of severe reactions to combat stress.  As the war progressed the 
Army mental health community adopted a new strategy of “every soldier has a breaking 
point” as their motto.  The lessons of the First World War with respect to the handling 
and treatment of combat psychiatric casualties (treat quickly, rest briefly, and explain and 
act with the expectation that the soldier will return to his unit) were initially forgotten but 
soon became standard (Marlowe, 2001). Soldiers and Marines who broke down during 
the early phases of World War II were usually evacuated, and many became long-term  
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psychiatric patients.  Reviewing the issue of psychiatric casualties from Guadalcanal an 
Army psychiatrist named Theodore Lidz (1946) noted that, 
 …even the non-psychiatric casualties showed emotional reactions 
of a severity that would have been considered incapacitating in 
later campaigns.  In addition to anxiety and depression, symptoms 
included headaches, anorexia . . . tremors, insomnia, nightmares 
and palpitation which were individual symptoms or could all be 
present in one man. 
 
By the end of World War II most mental health providers realized that 
prolonged combat-environment exposure could alter the soldier’s ability to maintain a 
reasonable level of performance.  The anticipated reality of returning veterans with 
mental health issues led to the passing of the National Mental Health Act (1945) which 
provided for an expansion of Veteran’s Affairs mental health facilities throughout the 
United States. 
c.   Vietnam 
The Vietnam era is arguably the most studied generation of veterans yet.  
A highly complex and difficult subject to tackle due to the wide variety of literature and 
study results the Vietnam War deserves an examination well beyond the scope of this 
section.  Due to its identity as the first conflict where political realities had a major 
impact on veterans, increased media coverage and televised raw combat footage, 
increased racial tensions, and arguably the first morally ambiguous war of the twentieth 
century, this conflict continues to provide a plethora of data on mental health disorders.  
This war was certainly unique in that it fell into markedly different phases, each 
enmeshed in differing perceptions of the war, its nature, its legitimacy, and the manner in 
which it was fought. It produced markedly differing cohorts of psychological casualties 
through time.  Its largest group of psychological casualties appeared to arise after the 
veterans returned home among those who served in the period of lowest combat intensity.  
This time frame also coincides with the period when virulent anti-war protests became 
common and feelings of guilt, frustration, or betrayal by the government became more 
common among veterans.   
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An issue with dealing with mental health in Vietnam centered on the lack 
of historical data to provide clues for the military psychiatrists.  First and foremost these 
psychiatrists tended to be newly out of training and lacked the experience necessary to 
deal with the large number of cases that emerged (Huffman, 1970).  Second they were 
only provided historical examples from conflicts like World War II or Korea where only 
the front-line combat soldiers were exposed to the trauma.  In Vietnam, a large number of 
cases were composed of base camp soldiers, or rear-echelon troops, who never even saw 
combat.  Huffman observed that the extreme conditions of the environment and the 
constant fear of death led to many of the same symptoms that combat troops suffered 
from (1970).  Additional factors such as high levels of drug use among soldiers, the 
individual replacement system which provided no support structure, and finally the often 
abusive treatment that veterans received after coming “home” to a culture that had been 
polarized by the war, all produced many theories of mental health that ultimately 
coalesced into what we now term post-traumatic stress disorder (Marlowe, 2001).  
C.  CURRENT U.S. POLICY CONCERNING PTSD TREATMENT  
The Army has taken steps in the past year to alert leaders at all levels of command 
to be aware of the possibility of PTSD among subordinates and to be able to recognize 
the symptoms as well as treatment options.  Detailed guidance on implementation of the 
program was published on 17 July 2007 in an ALARACT titled,  
"Interim Guidance - Army Mild Traumatic Brain Injury (MTBI) / Post  
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Awareness and Response Program."  A chain-teaching 
package was distributed to all commands, and soldiers were required to attend this 
training in small groups conducive to discussion no later than October 2007.  This 
training was approved for distribution by the Army Chief of Staff.   
The intent of this training package is to de-stigmatize both the mental health 
disorder as well as provide instructions for soldiers and leaders on how to get help for 
those peers or subordinates suffering symptoms that are affecting work behavior and 
performance.  The help identified in the training package are buddies, unit leadership, 
unit chaplains, mental health providers (both military and civilian), ARMY One-Source, 
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and the Veteran’s Affairs Department (Battlemind Training Office, 2007).  The training 
package does an excellent job of relating current events and examples as a way to 
legitimize the behavior and encourage soldiers to seek help if they need it.   
 The shortcomings in both the training package and in current Army publications 
are the lack of identifiable processes and options after being referred to mental health 
physicians.  In addition there is no distinction between either voluntary or involuntary 
(command-directed) referrals.  MEDCOM Regulation 40-38 (1999) states that the 
reported findings and treatment/disposition recommendations of the mental health 
evaluation remain the responsibility of the patient’s mental health care provider.  The 
mental health provider has only two options in general: return to duty with treatment (in- 
or outpatient) or without treatment; or initiate Medical Evaluation Board Proceedings 
(MEB) to have the soldier either medically retired or discharged.  If the soldier is found 
fit for duty by the MEB Board then he is returned to service with no further mention 
made in his records of mental health treatment with regards to potential for promotion or 
eligibility to redeploy to a combat zone.         
D. RECENT STUDIES FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 
As the Global War on Terror continues into its fifth year the data available on the 
mental health of our combat veterans is becoming more readily available.  Trends in rates 
of PTSD and factors affecting its prevalence are becoming easier to apply to the military 
population as a whole.   
1.  Charles W. Hoge’s Study on Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan  
The study by Charles Hoge conducted in 2004 and published in the New England 
Journal is arguably the cornerstone of the research done on PTSD during the Global War 
on Terror.  For this study an anonymous survey was given to members of three Army 
units and one Marine unit either preparing to deploy or just having come back from Iraq 
or Afghanistan.  The fact that the soldiers/Marines were analyzed so soon after return 
from deployment is significant because, in previous conflicts, mental health studies were 
done long after the experiences of combat and may have been biased due to poor memory 
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or suppression of painful memories. The most significant findings of this study are 
simply the positive linear relationship between combat experiences and mental disorders 
like PTSD as well as identifying the barriers to care that are common among the military 
community.  This study provided the initial recognition of a significant detractor of 
military readiness. 
The method used to gather data for the study were through surveys.  The sample 
size that participated was a fairly significant number including 2,530 soldiers from an 
Army infantry brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division, whose responses were obtained 
prior to a year-long deployment to Iraq; 1,962 soldiers from an infantry brigade of the 
82nd Airborne Division, whose responses were obtained after a six-month deployment to 
Afghanistan; 894 soldiers from an Army infantry brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division, 
whose responses were obtained after an eight-month deployment to Iraq; and 815 
Marines from the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force who had also just returned from Iraq.  
However, there were significant numbers who could not take the survey due to other 
duties; this could cause selection bias among the sample.  In addition, surveys rely on 
honest answers from the respondents.  The results of the analysis could be skewed due to 
those soldiers and marines who were experiencing symptoms of PTSD opting out of 
taking the survey due to the fear of being discovered and the perception of potentially 
losing their careers.  The authors acknowledge that there is a potential selection bias with 
their methodology.  The authors themselves discovered that, of those whose responses 
met the screening criteria for a mental disorder, only 38 to 45 percent indicated an 
interest in receiving help, and only 23 to 40 percent reported having received professional 
help in the past year (Hoge, 2004).  This clearly indicates a potential bias among those 
administered the surveys who were concerned with the stigma of mental health disorders 
like PTSD.  Table 1 from Hoge’s study illustrates this point that 65 percentage points of 






be treated differently by their leaders.  Only 25 percentage points of those who met the 
screening criteria for a mental disorder felt that mental health providers would not work.   
 
Table 1.   Barriers to Mental Health Services (From Hoge, 2004).   
  
 This study noted that Iraq veterans were facing more instances of combat than 
those in Afghanistan and, as a result, were producing higher rates of mental health issues.  
These rates increased as the exposure to combat increased.  This positive relationship is 
generally what we would expect and reflect findings from previous studies (King, D. W., 
King, L. A., Foy, D. W., Keane, T. M., & Fairbank, J. A., 1999).  Another aspect of this 
survey is that it focuses on PTSD among a specific sub-population of those deployed; the 
combat soldier.  This study does not address the traditionally non-combat specialties like 
cooks, supply, finance, administrative, medical and others.  Due to the unique nature of 
both Iraq and Afghanistan these non-combat specialties who may not be seeking the 
“thrill” of combat are exposed to the same dangers as infantrymen on a daily basis.  
There is the potential that these specialties may have even higher rates than infantrymen 
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due to the unexpected traumas of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan.  As noted earlier many 
Vietnam veterans who developed PTSD were rear-echelon troops and not subjected to 
multiple periods of intense combat (Huffman, 1970).   
2.  Mental Health Assessment Team Surveys (MHAT) 
The MHAT studies were established by the Office of the Army Surgeon General 
and requested by the Commanding General, Multi-National Forces-Iraq.  The data for 
these reports came from surveys administered to soldiers and marines as well as focus 
groups and individual interviews that were conducted.  This study is important because it 
was the first one conducted in the combat zone.  The surveys revealed that the most 
common combat stressors were seeing dead human bodies, being attacked or ambushed, 
and knowing someone who was seriously injured or killed. The most common 
operational stressors were uncertain redeployment date, long deployments, being 
separated from family and lack of privacy (U.S. Army PAO News Release, accessed 9 
February 2008 at http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/read.php?story_id_key=5798).  The 
MHAT studies have revealed that combat operations in Iraq tend to be up close and 
personal.  Table 2 is indicative of the high proportion of troops who have been exposed to 
trauma and may show a propensity towards developing PTSD: 
 
Table 2.   Combat Experiences of soldiers and marines during OIF 05-07 compared 
to soldiers in OIF1 and OIF 04-06 (in MHAT IV, 2007). 
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The findings of the MHAT IV study reveal that the level of combat is still the 
main determinant of a soldier's or marine's mental-health status.  For soldiers, 
deployment length and family separations were the top non-combat deployment issues; 
due to shorter deployment lengths, Marines had fewer non-combat deployment concerns. 
As a result one of the MHAT’s recommendations were for shorter deployments which 
would allow soldiers and marines better opportunities to "reset" mentally before returning 
to combat.  Soldiers and marines reported general discontent with the enforcement of 
garrison-like rules in a combat environment.  Overall, soldiers had higher rates of mental-
health issues than marines but when matched for deployment length and deployment 
history, the mental-health rates were similar.  Multiple deployments caused troops to 
report higher acute stress than servicemen on their first deployment.  Deployment length 
was related to higher rates of mental-health problems.  
3.  APA Study on Barriers to Care 
As noted above in the Current Policies section the United States military, and 
specifically the Army, has identified the need for research into the effects of post-
traumatic stress disorder on the combat readiness of its numerous brigade-sized elements 
and weapon systems.  However, the resulting programs and policies have thus far fallen 
short of being useful, effective or helpful in de-stigmatizing PTSD sufferers.  The 
American Psychological Association, at the request of the Department of Defense, 
established the Task Force on Military Deployment Services for Youth, Families and 
Service Members in July of 2006 with the intent of identifying the mental health needs of 
soldiers and their family members both during and after deployment (Johnson, 2007).  
The programs identified in the APA study have been limited to certain installations (like 
Fort Lewis, WA and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii) and have not been coordinated at the 
DoD-level.  Evidence of this is provided by Table 3 from the MHAT studies.   
While Table 3 shows some improvement in the perceptions of service members 




that feels either stigma or difficulty in seeking help.  This study by the American 
Psychiatric Association recommends that further research be conducted, especially in 
 
Table 3.   Perceived Barriers to Behavioral Health Services - Deployed Service 
Members (in MHAT IV, 2007). 
 
 
the areas of researching mental health among special populations, such as women, 
minorities, and gays and lesbians.  Any new policies would be best implemented by the 
Department of Defense.  Further, the Department of Defense needs to formulate a clear 
plan for change that is compatible across all service branches. By providing careful 
oversight, mental health leaders could begin to reduce the barriers to quality care. The 
urgency with which this should be done cannot be overstated. Never before has our 
nation been engaged in a conflict requiring redeployment of service members who have 
already been diagnosed with PTSD to the same combat zone where they were originally 
traumatized. This policy was recently announced by the Assistant Undersecretary of 
Defense responsible for Health Affairs (Winkenwerder, 2006) and sets a dangerous 
precedent.  The effectiveness and mental stability of these already traumatized service 
members is certainly suspect and sends a clear message that our Nation is willing to 





As the Global War on Terror continues the continued effort of researchers is 
paramount in making a difference in the lives of our veterans.  The ability to identify 
demographic or service-unique characteristics that can lead to PTSD can focus mental 
health efforts from the medical community while promoting a willingness on the part of 
society to accept that PTSD is a result of combat trauma and provide the impetus to deal 
with these issues.  In the next chapter we will be looking at the sociological and 
psychological aspects that are causes and indicators of PTSD.  This information will be 
used to provide additional background data on the thought processes and aspects of 
combat that tend to help explain the prevalence of PTSD among our combat veterans.  
Following this qualitative analysis we will look in the following chapter at data on a 
rarely-studied population—the veterans of the U.S. Navy—and will be examining 
whether their rates of PTSD are similar to Army and Marine Corps veterans or if there 
are any trends that can be seen from deployment history and demographic information.  It 
will provide new information on how experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have affected 
our sailors and later on will provide policy recommendations for the Department of 
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III. PSYCHOLOGICAL EXAMINATION OF COMBAT ON 
RATES OF PTSD 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will describe and discuss information about the sociological and 
psychological reasons why hostile deployments, combat and killing in general have such 
a significant impact on rates of post-traumatic stress disorder.  This chapter will also 
provide background information designed to explain any significant differences in 
propensity to develop PTSD among the different branches of service (Navy, Army, 
Marine Corps, and Air Force) that we may find in the data being analyzed.  LTC Dave 
Grossman’s book, “On Killing,” although written in 1995, provides us with an excellent 
model in order to examine how soldiers react to combat and how they can be trained to 
kill which potentially damages mental health for the long term.  Additionally, through the 
use of more recent articles, we will also look at the impact of almost five years of war on 
a significant portion of our Nation’s military strength and how LTC Grossman’s book is 
just as important now as when he wrote it in 1995.  
B. “THE SOLDIER’S DILEMMA” 
In “On Killing,” the author postulates that soldiers on the battlefield are faced 
with several choices, all of which have a tremendous impact on their mental health.  
Despite training, each soldier is ultimately responsible for his or her actions on the 
battlefield.  The two obvious responses are to either fight or flee.  Grossman identifies 
two additional options for the soldier in combat: posture or submit. 
Throughout history and even in our own recent conflicts up to the Vietnam era, 
few soldiers actually had the will to kill when faced with the enemy.  One of the most 
noted of military historians is S.L.A. Marshall, who discovered through his own research 
that only 15-20 percentage points of combat infantrymen in World War II actually fired 
at the enemy (1978).  The remainder often never even fired their weapon at all.  If they 
did shoot then it was often intentionally done over the heads or in the general direction 
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(without aiming) of the enemy with the intent of “scaring off” the enemy.  This 
“posturing” is another one of the responses described by Grossman.   The third response 
is flight.  When confronted with the possibility of killing or being killed many soldiers 
will choose to flee if the opportunity presents itself.  This option is usually performed by 
lone soldiers or soldiers who managed to get separated from their unit.  Once back in the 
comfort of being surrounded by friends this option becomes less appealing as the desire 
to “not let your buddies down” becomes stronger.   
Submission is the fourth response but arguably much rarer now during the Global 
War on Terror than in previous conflicts where the Geneva Conventions were upheld (for 
the most part) by our opponents.  The current war against insurgents and terrorists has 
potentially eliminated this option from the soldier’s dilemma given the penchant in Iraq 
or Afghanistan for captured soldiers being beheaded or worse on television for 
propaganda purposes.   
The military prior to Vietnam began to realize this aversion to killing and changed 
its training programs to improve the percentages of those willing to kill.  Through operant 
conditioning (rewards for shooting and hitting man-shaped targets, punishment for 
missing) in basic training, the shooting percentages in Vietnam reached 90-95 percentage 
points.  Over the following decades since the end of Vietnam and the Draft the men and 
women of the All-Volunteer Force have perhaps come close to perfecting the ability to 
kill.  However, what has not been considered is the psychological damage done to 
soldiers after they redeploy home. 
C. WHAT SEPARATES SAILORS FROM SOLDIERS – DISTANCE 
As noted in the Literature Review chapter the majority of studies on PTSD has 
been done with soldiers and marines in mind.  Put simply, this is due to the higher 
percentage of PTSD rates among ground combat troops which eliminates the Navy as 
well as the Air Force from the research.  The question to ask is why?  What factors in a 
hostile deployment cause this difference?  Grossman suggests a simple answer to these 
questions by pointing out that sailors rarely kill their opponents at close range.  Sailors 
today normally act as part of a crew of a ship with duties that may not change regardless 
  23
of whether the zone is hostile or not.  In addition, the average sailor if he does pull the 
trigger and fires a shell or missile rarely sees the results at all, especially in modern 
warfare since the targets may not even be within visible range.  Those sailors who have a 
view of battle from unmanned aerial vehicles or cameras attached to missiles still do not 
experience the same gut reactions as ground combat personnel do.  The overload of 
sensory data is missing from the sailor’s experience which is often a significant 
contributing factor to PTSD.  Sailors will not smell burnt flesh and excrement, or hear the 
screaming, or see the blood pumping from open wounds of the enemy sailors they have 
killed with shell or missile.  In essence, naval gunner’s onboard ships are simply 
“servicing targets.”  This allows most sailors to boast of shooting down two airplanes or 
sinking a ship without carrying the emotional baggage of thinking about the people they 
killed while performing their duty.   
As part of a crew, it is also much easier for sailors to attribute any killing done as 
being essential in preserving the safety of their comrades within the ship.  The fear of 
letting buddies down is often quoted as being the biggest fear in combat.  Another avenue 
of emotional escape for many sailors is that they are being ordered to target an enemy 
vessel by senior officers.  This allows the passing of guilt from their shoulders to others 
(Grossman, 1995). 
There is nothing personal for most sailors deployed to hostile zones.  Even should 
a ship be hit by incoming shellfire or missiles the average sailor does not necessarily feel 
personally singled out for death.  For a soldier or marine engaged in ground combat there 
is no doubt that the bullets impacting nearby are meant specifically for them and it 
becomes extremely personal at that point.  Anger is the first emotion often felt by ground 
troops and helps ease the mental burden by justifying their response of shooting back.  In 
additional most sailors do not face the death or severe wounding of comrades with such 
regularity as soldiers and marines do.  In the course of a tour in Iraq or Afghanistan most 
soldiers and marines will see not only their buddies wounded and killed on multiple 
occasions but will also see horrors associated with the violent deaths of innocent civilians 
who got caught in the middle of a suicide bombing or an ambush on U.S. forces.  
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D. DESENSITIZATION TO HORROR 
In “On Killing,” LTC Grossman points to the desensitization of our youth as a 
potential contributing factor to the murder rate and violent assaults committed in our 
country.  As the youth of America today join the military they have already had years of 
experience in operant conditioning to kill through ultra-violent movies and video games.  
First person shooting games that glorify mass murder and carnage help desensitize our 
youth and convince them that killing is easy.  Horror movies and action heroes who do 
not obey law and order simplify the equation for many immature teenagers into one 
where might makes right and violence does solve everything.   
Many of the modern tools of war contribute to this desensitization of our military.  
With technological advances that make it possible to drop bombs and missiles with 
pinpoint accuracy it truly has made warfare “push button” in nature.  Death and killing is 
observed through a television screen that helps distance emotionally the act from the 
actor.  For many they see death on a screen and it seems no more real than the violent 
movie they may have seen the previous night.     
Another technological advancement is the use of thermal imaging and night 
vision devices.  These tools provide a huge advantage with regards to camouflage; 
darkness and terrain no longer hide the enemy from our weapon systems.  In fact, 
because of these tools the American method of warfare has changed to fighting primarily 
at night.  An additional positive in terms of engaging the enemy is that when using these 
devices enemies appear as greenish blobs or white heat spots.  It is then much easier to 
“service targets” than if the target has a face that looks similar to ours.  Technology may 
ease the mental resistance to killing but what it can not do is take away the emotional 
destruction that occurs afterwards (Grossman, 1995). 
E. CURRENT INDICATIONS OF MILITARY-WIDE TRAUMA 
The United States military has now been at war for five years.  The level of stress 
on our military, especially the Army and Marine Corps, is unparalleled in our history.  
Multiple deployments and increased tour lengths have inevitably contributed to the 
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trauma that many veterans experience.  As discussed above technology may make it 
easier to kill but a solution to post-deployment mental health issues has been sorely 
lacking.  For those who have killed in combat the initial feelings of exhilaration at being 
alive are soon replaced by remorse, guilt and anger (Grossman, 1995).  Remorse is 
powerful and an emotion that rarely goes away for combat veterans who have killed.  In 
the moment of kill or be killed there is rapid reaction with little time to think.  The killing 
is normally quick but remorse lasts for a lifetime, regardless of whether the killing was 
justified or not.  Guilt and revulsion at the act soon follows as well.  Once a soldier has 
returned to a place of safety it becomes quite normal to relive the experience only this 
time he or she has time to reflect on what could have happened (I could have died, he 
nearly got me, my wife would have been without a husband, my child without a father, 
what if the enemy soldier has a family, etc.).  There is nothing to compare the rawness 
and power of these emotions and as such it should not be a surprise that many veterans 
have mental disorders like PTSD upon return from a combat zone.  In addition this 
pressure on the mental health of veterans often leads to other significant actions with 
family and friends who can not understand the horror the service member has 
experienced.  Throughout the literature review a common thread appears after the end of 
each conflict; a desire to forget about the trauma of war and an unwillingness to talk 
about what was experienced.  This in turn has led to increases among the veteran 
populations concerning domestic violence and suicide, which I will now discuss. 
1. Domestic Violence 
Spousal abuse has always been an issue of concern for the military.  In a New 
York Times article in February 2008 the authors note that domestic violence is not a new 
phenomenon in the military (New York Times, 2008).  In 1998 a congressionally-
mandated task force was established to look at domestic violence policy in the military 
and make recommendations designed to lower the rates of spousal and child abuse.  The 
stress of military life even before the beginning of the Global War on Terror was such 
that the perception of the rising rates of domestic violence had to be addressed.  This task 
force was unfortunately dissolved soon after GWOT began.  The additional stress of 
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multiple deployments and longer tour durations has had huge impacts on families without 
problems let alone those with prior issues of anger and abuse.  The NY Times article cites 
Christine Hansen, Miles Foundation Executive Director, which provides domestic 
violence assistance to military spouses, said “the organization’s work has tripled since the 
war in Iraq began” (New York Times, 2008).  In FY 2003, 17,000 reported cases of 
spouse abuse occurred involving military personnel. Ninety-eight hundred were later 
substantiated after further investigation, giving a rate of substantiated aggression of 14.2 
per 1000 according to the Department of Defenses records (Family Advocacy Program, 
2005).  A 2006 study in The Journal of Marital and Family Therapy looked at veterans 
who sought marital counseling at a Veterans Affairs medical center in the Midwest 
between 1997 and 2003. Those given a diagnosis of PTSD were “significantly more 
likely to perpetrate violence toward their partners,” the study found.  Domestic violence 
rates among veterans with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) were identified as being 
higher than those of the general population.  Couples in which the veteran was diagnosed 
with combat-related PTSD were compared with two other groups.  The PTSD-diagnosed 
veterans perpetrated more violence than did those in the other groups (Sherman, M.D., 
Sautter, F., Jackson, M.H., Lyons, J.A., & Han, X., 2006).   
Grossman’s model can also be used in the understanding of a serious sub-category 
of domestic violence; that of the murder-suicide.  For the combat veteran the killing 
response stages are the same in domestic violence as they are in combat.  Driven by anger 
and rage, the veteran may kill his or her spouse and children.  At first the veteran is filled 
with the exhilaration of making the kill but is then immediately filled with the remorse 
and anguish of hurting someone they love.  The overload of emotions becomes too much 
to handle and leads to suicide (Grossman, 1995).       
The societal implications are enormous.  The early identification and treatment of 
PTSD among veterans is vital to the stability of familiar relationships.  If unchecked and 
not treated increasing rates of domestic violence will become more likely as the GWOT 
continues past its fifth year.  Repeated deployments and increasing stress levels make a 
deadly combination that could lead to more domestic violence after returning from 
combat zones in Iraq or Afghanistan. 
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2. Suicide Rates 
Suicide among veterans has been a hot topic since the Vietnam War ended.  For 
Vietnam veterans, as mentioned in Chapter II, estimates range from 20,000 to 150,000 
suicides (National Coalition for Homeless Veterans, 2007).  Many researchers believe it 
may even be higher than this due to deaths being recorded by County-level coroners who 
might be inclined to define the cause of death as accidental or something else to ease the 
stigma for the surviving family.  Although there is a wide variance due to lack of 
centralized data gathering at the Department of Veteran’s Affairs this issue has again 
become an issue with news articles, specifically one done by CBS which is described 
below, describing an “epidemic” of suicides among Iraq and Afghanistan veterans.  This 
issue has caused considerable alarm among Congress and the President.   
   In November 2007 President Bush signed the Joshua Omvig Suicide Prevention 
Act which is named for an Iowa soldier who committed suicide upon his return from Iraq.  
The bill requires mandatory psychological screening of veterans returning home. Those at 
higher risk of committing suicide would be referred for counseling.  This legislation is 
essentially what the DD Form 2796 is meant to assess which has actually been in place 
since 2003.  This bill primarily takes the discretion in the screening process out of the 
hands of Theater Combatant Commanders and makes it mandatory that all deployed 
soldiers receive the attention of healthcare providers.  CBS News did an investigation 
asking all 50 states for death records that indicated suicide for both veterans and non-
veterans.  Forty-five states responded and this data was analyzed by Dr. Steve Rathbun, 
the department head and a Professor of Epidemiology and Biostatistics at the University 
of Georgia.  He found in his analysis that “veterans were more than twice as likely to 
commit suicide in 2005 as non-vets. Veterans committed suicide at the rate of 18.7 to 
20.8 per 100,000, compared to other Americans, who did so at the rate of 8.9 per 
100,000” (CBS News, 2007).  The VA and DoD have publicly questioned the validity of 
this study and object to the term “epidemic” based on flawed and incomplete data from 
death records from each state.  Whether this increase in suicides is an “epidemic” or not 
is frankly not relevant.  Any increase in the number of suicides among veterans is an 
indication that procedures need to be put in place to reverse this trend immediately. 
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F. PROJECTED FINDINGS OF DMDC / AMSA DATA SET 
It is important to keep in mind that this thesis focuses only on Navy personnel 
who tend to have different combat experiences from the Marines or soldiers.  Based on 
the literature review and findings from LTC Grossman’s work I anticipate that the sailors 
in the data set will have significantly lower rates of PTSD than what would be found 
among soldiers and marines.  This does not mean that this data is worthless, as it can 
surely point to trends, even among sailors, on what factors are significant in altering the 
rates of PTSD based on the effect of multiple deployments and increased tour lengths.  
Further examination of this data may provide helpful recommendations for all services 
within the Department of Defense.  The next chapter in this thesis will examine the data 
provided by DMDC and AMSA in more detail and provide summary statistics for 
analysis. 
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have defined and described the psychological aspects of 
combat, especially the act of killing, and applied it to explaining several things.  First, 
that certain factors such as individual decisions made in combat to posture, fight, flee, 
and submit can help determine mental health issues after returning from deployment.  
Second, naval personnel may not have as high of a propensity to develop PTSD based on 
the distance involved in naval warfare versus the soldier or marine who is face to face 
with the aftermath of his or her decision to kill.  The sailor has a better ability and 
opportunity to distance himself from the act of killing than ground troops do.  Finally, we 
examined potential indicators that our military has become stressed to the point where 
combat readiness and efficiency are reduced, specifically through increases in rates of 
suicide and domestic violence.  These acts of violence and aggression, whether aimed at 
the individual or at their family, often has at its root the mental anguish that servicemen 
experience after returning from deployments to hostile zones.        
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IV. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will describe and give information about the data, discuss limitations 
and present the summary statistics based on demographics and frequency distributions of 
the variables. 
B. DATA SOURCE 
The data for this thesis comes from both DMDC (Defense Manpower Data 
Center) and AMSA (Army Medical Surveillance Activity). It was constructed from two 
main datasets: The Active Duty Personnel Cohort File and the DD2796 Post-Deployment 
Health Assessment Survey.  Both data files were sanitized of all identifying personal 
information such as Social Security Numbers by AMSA and unique identification 
numbers were used for each observation.  This provided us with a sterile dataset with 
minimal risk to the human subjects while allowing for the clean merging of the two 
datasets.  Due to the size of these files and the requirement to separately analyze officers 
and enlisted naval personnel two master datasets were created by merging the officer files 
from DMDC with the corresponding DD2796 data for one set and merging the enlisted 
files with the DD2796 data for the other dataset.  From an original total of 13,433 officer 
observations and 119,126 enlisted observations from the DMDC and AMSA data file, 
5,540 of them were deleted due to missing information or corrupted values, leaving 
13,096 officer and 114,023 enlisted observations in the final datasets for the analysis.  
1. The Active Duty Personnel Cohort File 
The Active Duty Personnel Cohort File is built from the Active Duty Personnel 
Extract Files (PER), collected on a monthly basis, and contains one or more records for 
each unique combination of PER Member SSN, PER Service, and PER Personnel Type.  
Also included in this cohort file is the Active Duty Pay File which was helpful in 
determining deployment history for each service member.  It has been tracking all active 
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duty personnel since December 1987. The dataset contained enough data elements to 
describe different demographic characteristics. Since the main focus of the study are 
naval personnel and their deployment lengths and types associated with the Global War 
on Terror, the data was collected in a way that deleted data prior to 2002 as well as 
deleting all observations for services other than the Navy.  Included in this cohort file are 
monthly extracts from the Active Duty Pay File.  The Active Duty Pay File provides data 
on all basic pays, special pays, as well as additional payments made on a monthly basis.  
Family Separation Allowance (FSA) and Hostile Fire Pay/Imminent Danger Pay 
(HFP/IDP), which are commonly used indicators of deployment, was used to create a 
deployment history for each service member.  This also allowed the separation of hostile 
deployments from non-hostile deployments as well as deployment duration.  The last 
information to be used in the analysis was collected in December 2006.  Independent 
variables used for this study include sex, gender, education level, rank, marital status, and 
deployment history.  DMDC has started gathering OIF/OEF deployment information for 
personnel since 2004.  However, it is still relatively new and not yet useful for long term 
mental health analysis.  DMDC has a similar file that tracks Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
deployment data and has proven to be important to studies surrounding this earlier 
conflict. 
2. DD 2796 Post Deployment Health Assessments 
The purpose of the DD2796 is to assess the active-duty servicemen’s state of 
health after deployment outside the United States in support of military operations and to 
assist healthcare providers in identifying and providing present and future medical care.  
It was developed and first distributed in April 2003 shortly after OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM (OIF) began.  The DD 2796 is required per the decision of the Service 
component commander or commander exercising operational control if any health threats 
or exposures that warrant medical assessment occurred.  Everyone required a DD Form 
2796 must be administered with a trained health care provider during in-theater medical 
out-processing or within 30 days after returning to home station.  This screening is used 
to review each active-duty servicemen’s current health, mental health or psychosocial 
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issues commonly associated with deployments, possible deployment-related 
occupational/environmental exposures, and to discuss deployment-related health 
concerns. Positive responses require referrals for further medical evaluation. The health 
care provider documents referral needs and discusses resource options available. 
The question evaluated in this thesis is associated with Question #12 on the DD 
2796.  In order to be diagnosed with PTSD, the active-duty servicemen must meet criteria 
spelled out in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and have 
a diagnostic code in ICD-9 of 309.81.  All four sub-questions of #12 (see Figure 1 below)  
  
Figure 1.   Question #12 of the DD Form 2796 (April 2003) 
                         
 
are directly sourced from the DSM.  For the purpose of this study, the propensity to 
develop PTSD was defined as responding positively to at least two of the four sub-
questions.  The remaining variables (have nightmares, avoiding situations, on guard, 
detached) are taken directly from the four sub-questions in Figure 1.  The observations 
were coded as having a value of 1 if the response was “Yes” to the question; and the 
observation was coded 0 otherwise.  This procedure is similar to that used by the MHAT 
studies to determine PTSD rates among its sample.  When tabulated from our sample the 
results were given on the two tables on the following page. 
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 Comparing these numbers with the MHAT studies we see that sailors in general 
have a much lower propensity to develop PTSD (2.14% for officers and 3.93% for  
 
Table 4.   Tabulated # of Navy Officers with propensity to develop PTSD 
                         
1=propensity 
to develop 
PTSD Frequency Percent Cum.
0 12816 97.86% 97.86%
1 280 2.14% 100.00%
Total 13096 100.00%  
 
 
Table 5.   Tabulated # of Navy Enlisted with propensity to develop PTSD 
                         
1=propensity 
to develop 
PTSD Frequency Percent Cum.
0 109544 96.07% 96.07%
1 4479 3.93% 100.00%
Total 114023 100.00%  
 
enlisted sailors from Tables 4-5) than either combat soldiers or marines (generally in the 
14-17% range according to the Hoge studies and the MHAT studies).  On the surface this 
appears a valid conclusion given that the vast majority of sailors do not see face-to-face 
combat like the marines and soldiers do.  The reasons for the disparity in percentages will 
be examined in the next chapter on the sociological and psychological aspects of PTSD 
among veterans.  In addition, the large size of our sample (127,119 observations) 
compared to the MHAT studies (roughly 1,500 observations per yearly sample) seems to 
validate this initial conclusion.  However, there are limitations in the data which will be 
discussed in the next section.         
C. DATA RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
The data for this analysis was limited to those observations from October 2002 




within the scope of this analysis.  Since the focus of this analysis was on OIF/OEF naval 
personnel it was felt that deployment and PTSD issues for those individuals would have 
had different causality factors.   
Another shortcoming of reliance on the DD 2796 is in the timing of its 
administration.  This form is given to each deployed servicemen by a healthcare provider 
during the redeployment process while still in the combat zone or within thirty days of 
arrival back at home station.  Both administration scenarios are problematic.  Service 
members are quick to realize that positive responses to many of the questions on the 
survey will possibly delay their redeployment.  Thus many personnel will answer in such 
a way that mental health problems are not identified and adequately noted.  In addition, 
the very nature of PTSD is that symptoms often do not manifest until months or even 
years after the traumatic event.  The thirty day timeframe after redeployment is often a 
“honeymoon” period with family members and symptoms may be suppressed in the short 
term.   
In these datasets the number and duration of deployments are identified by 
looking at the monthly pay records of every individual. Family Separation Allowance 
(FSA) and Hostile Fire Pay/Imminent Danger Pay (HFP/IDP) are utilized during this 
identification. Single sailors are not eligible to get FSA pay, so those service members 
without dependents have no values in their records if they were deployed to non-hostile 
areas in a particular month.  Hostile deployments are captured in the data since they 
would have received HFP/IDP payments.  In addition, it requires a deployment to last 
more than thirty continuous days in order to be eligible to receive the additional pay. 
D. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
1.   Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
The dependent variable d96_ptsd is defined as the propensity to develop PTSD 
by responding positively to at least two of the four sub-questions of Question #12.  If a 
sailor met these criteria then the observation was coded as having a value of 1; and the 
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observation was coded 0 otherwise.   This variable was the primary focus in our probit 
regression models due to all variables being binary in nature.  The explanatory variables 
primarily consisted of demographic data (gender, ethnicity, age and marital status), 
current rank, and deployment history. These demographics were applied to both officer 
and enlisted datasets.  Deployment history variables were built using the FSA/IDP data 
and were broken into several different categories.  These variables will be discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter V as the regression models are defined and examined. 
2. Data Description for Officers by GWOT Deployment / Demographics 
Table 6-7 provides summary statistics background to the sample of naval officers 
detailing those who have deployed in support of the Global War on Terror and those who 
have deployed prior according to data.  The percentage of officers who have deployed to 
GWOT is relatively high among our sample which should not be surprising since GWOT 
is now approaching its fifth year of conflict.  Although the overall percentage of officers 
who have responded positively to question #12 on the DD 2796 in our sample is 
relatively low (less than 3 percentage points in all categories) Table 6 clearly shows an 
increase in the spectrum of potential mental health issues in the population of GWOT 
officers compared to those officers who deployed pre-GWOT.  According to Table 6 
even prior to the beginning of the Global War on Terror there were still significant 
 
Table 6.   Mental Health Outcomes Descriptive Statistics for Naval Officers 
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Dependent variables
PTSD from dd2796 2.10% 0.15 1.70% 0.13 2.30% 0.15
have nightmares 2.36% 0.15 2.14% 0.14 2.44% 0.15
avoid similar situations 1.93% 0.14 1.54% 0.12 2.09% 0.14
on guard 2.56% 0.16 2.58% 0.16 2.55% 0.16









numbers of deployment personnel who experienced nightmares as well as feeling of 
being on guard or who startled easily.   
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 Certainly these numbers become even more interesting as these two categories 
(pre-GWOT and GWOT) are further broken down in hostile versus non-hostile 
components for each category.  You can see in Table 7 that deployment personnel to 
hostile zones, regardless of timeframe, suffer from the propensity to develop PTSD and 
 
Table 7.   Mental Health Outcomes for Officers by Hostile/Non-hostile 
mean sd mean sd
PTSD from dd2796 0.80% 0.09 5.20% 0.22
have nightmares 1.28% 0.11 5.07% 0.22
avoid similar situations 0.89% 0.09 3.74% 0.19
on guard 1.10% 0.10 7.61% 0.27
feeling detached 1.10% 0.10 4.35% 0.20
Total Observations
mean sd mean sd
PTSD from dd2796 1.30% 0.11 4.90% 0.22
have nightmares 1.51% 0.12 4.83% 0.21
avoid similar situations 1.38% 0.12 3.92% 0.19
on guard 0.92% 0.10 6.75% 0.25
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other mental health issues at a much higher rate than those deployed to non-hostile areas.  
The increase from only .80% and 1.30% mean in non-hostile tours compared to 5.20% 
and 4.90% respectively in hostile tours certainly seems to confirm previous finding on the 
relationship between combat increasing rates of PTSD among veterans.  Of additional 
note is the general increase in mental health symptoms even among non-hostile naval 
personnel from pre-GWOT to current GWOT operations.  The data shows that perhaps 
the current operating environment is more stressful and conducive to mental strain (from 
.80% pre-GWOT to 1.30% GWOT) than in the past.   
 In Table 8 this set of summary statistics will examine the characteristics of the 
naval officer sample in terms of both demographics and deployment history.  The rank 
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distribution remains relatively equal among both pre-GWOT and GWOT officers with 
junior officers (O1-O3) accounting for the largest percentage at roughly 61% of the  
 
Table 8.   Demographic/Deployment History of  Naval Officers  
         
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Non-hostile 74.53% 0.41 79.42% 0.38 72.37% 0.42
Hostile 25.47% 0.44 20.58% 0.40 27.63% 0.45
Deploy for 1-30 days 10.43% 0.31 9.87% 0.30 10.68% 0.31
Deploy for 31-180 days 14.77% 0.35 16.85% 0.37 13.84% 0.35
Deploy > 180 days 9.95% 0.30 4.75% 0.21 12.26% 0.33
deployed at least once 52.98% 0.50 51.57% 0.50 53.60% 0.50
hostile deployment at 
least once 35.15% 0.48 31.46% 0.46 36.78% 0.48
non-hostile deployment 
at least once 37.97% 0.49 37.65% 0.48 38.12% 0.49
total non-hostile 
deployments (in months) 1.11 2.27 1.16 2.27 1.09 2.28
total hostile deployments 
(in months) 1.29 2.52 1.17 2.24 1.35 2.64
Rank Distribution 
Warrant Officers 4.19% 0.20 4.37% 0.20 4.11% 0.20
Junior Officers(O1-O3) 61.53% 0.49 60.36% 0.49 62.05% 0.49
Field Grade Officers         
(O4-O5) 29.45% 0.46 29.37% 0.46 29.49% 0.46
General Officers 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00 0.00% 0.00
Gender
Male 86.41% 0.34 86.90% 0.34 86.19% 0.35
Female 13.59% 0.34 13.10% 0.34 13.81% 0.35
Race/Ethnicity 
White 79.21% 0.41 78.96% 0.41 79.32% 0.41
Black 8.50% 0.28 8.51% 0.30 8.49% 0.29
Others 12.29% 0.33 12.53% 0.33 12.19% 0.33
Marital Status 
Single 23.51% 0.42 23.12% 0.42 23.68% 0.43
Single with dependents 13.44% 0.34 15.62% 0.36 12.46% 0.33
Any Married 58.22% 0.49 55.36% 0.50 59.52% 0.49
Education 
Bachelor's degree 47.87% 0.50 46.20% 0.50 48.61% 0.50
Master's  and above 37.98% 0.49 39.52% 0.49 37.30% 0.48
Other educ. credentials 14.15% 0.35 14.28% 0.35 14.10% 0.35
Years of Service
YOS 10.33 7.54 10.24 7.53 10.37 7.55
Sample size 13,096 4,024 9,072
All Officer Observations
Officers deployed pre-
GWOT (on or before 
3/2003)
Officers deployed 
after GWOT (after 
3/2003)
Environment of current deployment  
Deployment History (based on 36 months prior to the current deployment)
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sample.  Field grade officers are the next largest group with roughly 30 percentage points 
of the sample regardless of timeframe.  Years of service and educational background also 
remains stable as well.  The average years of service for the officers in this dataset are 
roughly 10-10.5 years both in general and when divided into the pre-GWOT and GWOT 
cohorts.  Thus it appears that deployment demographics remain relatively stable between 
pre-GWOT and GWOT timeframes.  This is probably explained by the relatively strict 
structure of manning combat vessels and other requirements in deployment packages.   
 In this dataset the overwhelming percentage of naval officers are white (79.21%) 
and male (86.14%).  Minorities in particular make up a far smaller percentage than the 
general population the military tries to represent.  One other note is the high percentage 
(37.98%) of naval officers who have obtained a Master’s Degree or higher.  I would 
suspect that the educational background of Army or Marine officers compared to naval 
officers would be much lower due to higher operational tempo during GWOT and fewer 
opportunities for graduate education.     
3.   Data Description for Enlisted by GWOT Deployment / Demographics 
Table 9-10 provides summary statistics background to the sample of enlisted 
sailors detailing those who have deployed in support of the Global War on Terror and 
those who have deployed prior according to data.  The number of sailors who have 
deployed to GWOT is relatively high (77,731) compared to those who deployed prior to 
the start of GWOT (36,292).  The large number of observations however should provide  
 
Table 9.   Mental Health Outcomes Descriptive Statistics for Enlisted Sailors  
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Dependent variables
PTSD from dd2796 3.90% 0.19 3.70% 0.19 4.00% 0.20
have nightmares 4.05% 0.20 4.05% 0.20 4.05% 0.20
avoid similar situations 3.74% 0.19 3.67% 0.19 3.77% 0.19
on guard 3.71% 0.19 3.67% 0.19 3.73% 0.19










fairly reliable statistics on this population.  In Table 9 the overall data supports the 
increase of developing PTSD and indicators for those who deployed after the beginning 
of the GWOT (4.00%) compared to pre-GWOT deployments (3.70%).  However, there 
are relatively small incremental changes in each individual indicator.  In fact, according 
to our sample, the incidence of having nightmares after deployment is the same (4.05%) 
for both those who deployed pre-GWOT and GWOT officers.  The differences become 
more apparent when we break these statistics further down into hostile versus non-hostile  
     
Table 10.   Mental Health Outcomes for Enlisted by Hostile/Non-hostile 
Dependent variables
mean sd mean sd
PTSD from dd2796 3.00% 0.17 7.70% 0.27
have nightmares 3.21% 0.18 8.14% 0.27
avoid similar situations 3.21% 0.18 5.90% 0.24
on guard 2.54% 0.16 9.12% 0.29
feeling detached 3.07% 0.17 5.43% 0.23
Total Observations
Dependent variables
mean sd mean sd
PTSD from dd2796 3.00% 0.17 9.30% 0.29
have nightmares 2.91% 0.17 9.66% 0.30
avoid similar situations 3.12% 0.17 6.95% 0.25
on guard 2.13% 0.14 11.57% 0.32














for both pre-GWOT and GWOT.  In Table 10 we see that the difference again is between 
hostile versus non-hostile deployments.  In general terms the number of hostile 
deployments for sailors is relatively low with roughly 19,000 sailors out of the total 
deployed population of 114,023 sailors in hostile zones.  The propensity for developing 
PTSD and the individual indicators remain almost exactly the same for non-hostile 
deployments regardless of deployment timeframe.  However, there are significant 
differences in the rates for hostile deployments.  GWOT sailors have much higher 
indicators for PTSD overall as well as in each of the individual indicators compared to
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Table 11.   Demographic Data of  Enlisted Naval Personnel from DMDC/AMSA  
  
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Non-hostile 83.40% 0.31 83.70% 0.31 83.28% 0.31
Hostile 16.60% 0.37 16.30% 0.37 16.72% 0.37
Deploy for 1-60 days 9.70% 0.30 10.15% 0.30 9.47% 0.29
Deploy for 61-180 days 67.11% 0.47 57.76% 0.49 71.80% 0.45
Deploy > 180 days 23.03% 0.42 32.03% 0.47 18.50% 0.39
deployed at least once 53.94% 0.50 55.24% 0.50 53.34% 0.50
hostile deployment at 
least once 40.98% 0.49 42.98% 0.50 40.04% 0.49
non-hostile deployment 
at least once 33.25% 0.47 30.15% 0.46 34.69% 0.48
total non-hostile 
deployments (in months) 1.27 2.88 1.30 2.92 1.25 2.85
total hostile deployments 
(in months) 1.50 2.47 1.60 2.33 1.45 2.53
Rank Distribution 
E1-E4 58.99% 0.49 60.30% 0.49 58.34% 0.49
E5-E7 39.00% 0.49 37.72% 0.48 39.62% 0.49
E8-E9 2.00% 0.14 1.96% 0.14 2.02% 0.33
Gender  
Male 88.10% 0.32 88.59% 0.32 87.83% 0.33
Female 11.90% 0.32 11.41% 0.32 12.16% 0.33
Race/Ethnicity 
White 55.60% 0.50 55.06% 0.50 55.92% 0.50
Black 21.60% 0.41 20.75% 0.41 22.03% 0.41
Others 22.70% 0.42 24.18% 0.43 22.05% 0.41
Marital Status 
Single 82.90% 0.38 89.56% 0.31 79.74% 0.40
Single with dependents 1.40% 0.14 1.54% 0.14 1.35% 0.14
Any Married 6.60% 0.25 6.42% 0.25 6.67% 0.25
Education 
High school graduate 85.60% 0.35 84.53% 0.36 86.15% 0.35
Bachelor's degree 5.90% 0.24 5.97% 0.24 5.88% 0.24
Master's  and above 0.20% 0.05 0.21% 0.05 0.20% 0.05
Other educ. credentials 8.20% 0.28 9.28% 0.29 7.77% 0.27
Years of Service
YOS 6.28 6.07 6.20 6.13 6.32 6.03
Sample size
Deployment History (based on 36 months prior to the current deployment)
Enlisted deployed pre-
GWOT (on or before 
3/2003)
Enlisted deployed 




Environment of current deployment  
114,023    
  40
pre-GWOT hostile deployments.  This could certainly be attributed to the heavier 
operational tempo and likelihood of experiencing a traumatic even in Iraq or Afghanistan 
compared to designated hostile zones prior to the beginning of GWOT.   
In Table 11 this set of summary statistics examines the characteristics of the 
enlisted sailor sample in terms of both demographics and deployment history.  The rank 
distribution remains relatively equal among both deployment timeframes.  The one slight 
difference is in an increase of E5 to E7’s in the GWOT deployment timeframe from 
37.72% to 39.62% with a corresponding loss in the number of junior sailors from 60.30% 
to 58.34% during the same window.  This gain is certainly positive and provides more 
experienced sailors to the fleet during the GWOT.  It may also be an indicator of a 
slowdown in the number of new sailors being recruited and normal promotion rates for 
those already in causing overqualified sailors doing menial tasks on board usually 
reserved for the more junior sailors. 
In terms of other demographics we find that the enlisted force is still 
predominantly white (55%) although much more equitable than within the officer ranks.  
The predominant sailor tends to be single (82.90%) and male (88.10%) and only has a 
high school education (85.60%).  This low education achievement can almost certainly be 
traced to fewer opportunities for education both prior to enlisting and while deployed and 
fewer opportunities for higher education as a duty assignment (such as the Naval 
Postgraduate School for naval officers).  
 With deployment history we see that the average number of months deployed in 
the past 36 months has remained consistent throughout the two timeframes.  The average 
sailor has only spent 1.27 months in a non-hostile deployment and 1.50 months during 
hostile deployments.  In fact, according to our sample the average number of months 
decreased for hostile deployments in the past 3 years from 1.60 (pre-GWOT) to 1.45 
months (GWOT).  
4.   Data Description for GWOT Deployment by Region 
 Another way of breaking the summary statistics into simpler terms is to look at 
the current deployments for both officer and enlisted samples through the use of Figure 2.  
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The largest number of deployments is not surprisingly those onboard a ship instead of 
deployments on land (48 percentage points for officers, 62 percentage points for 
enlisted).  The next two largest percentages of deployed naval personnel is in both Iraq  
 
Figure 2.   Current Deployments by Region 
       
























      

























and Kuwait.  The Persian Gulf area is certainly the center of deployments within GWOT.  
Afghanistan has far fewer Naval personnel deployed (slightly more than 1000 personnel, 
mostly SEALS, Spec Ops support and medical support).  It may be surprising to note 
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that, among deployed Naval personnel, 13% of officers and 12% of enlisted sailors (2078 
officers, 15349 enlisted sailors) are deployed to other remote locations not included in the 
pie charts.  
E. MAIN HYPOTHESIS 
One of the main issues being analyzed is the frequency of PTSD among those 
U.S. Navy personnel who serve longer tour lengths than those with shorter tours.  From 
an initial analysis of the datasets the results support the hypothesis that as the number and 
frequency of deployments increase, the propensity to develop PTSD is positively 
affected.  In addition a secondary question is whether the coefficient of this positive 
correlation will increase after the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003.  
Analysis reveals that there are differences in the propensity to develop PTSD between 
officers and enlisted personnel as well as hostile versus non-hostile zones both prior to 
GWOT and during GWOT.  These differences will be further analyzed in the following 
chapters. 
F. SUMMARY 
The main focus of this chapter is to understand and to begin doing an initial 
analysis of the datasets provided by AMSA and DMDC. By looking at the preliminary 
findings, the hypothesis that the propensity of developing PTSD is positively correlated 
with hostile deployments to OIF/OEF as well as other demographic factors is supported 
by the data.  Different demographic data and deployment history factors also have proven 
to be statistically significant in the propensity of naval personnel to develop PTSD.  
Results of demographic characteristics like age, education, marital status and gender 
support these findings and indicate that they might be the driving factors that contribute 
to the change in rates. The differences between the frequency and duration of hostile and 
non-hostile deployments can also be considered important variables in determining 
propensity for developing PTSD.  In the following chapters probit models will be further 




V. ANALYTICAL METHOD / VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
A. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
This chapter will describe and give information about the models used in the 
probit regressions and define both dependent and independent variables.  The primary 
research objective is to analyze the effect of repeated deployment and other deployment 
characteristics on the rate of PTSD among Navy personnel.  Secondary questions include 
identifying other potential risk factors for PTSD based on demographic and service 
characteristics.  Finally we will identify policy implications for the DoD due to these risk 
factors for PTSD after combat deployments. 
1. Dependent Variables Defined 
a. Primary Variable  
The primary variable is d96_ptsd.  In our model this variable is binary, 
where propensity to develop PTSD equals 1 and no propensity for PTSD equals 0.  The 
variable was defined as meeting the requirements for having a propensity to develop 
PTSD by responding positively to at least two of the four sub-questions of Question #12 
on the DD Form 2796.  These criteria meet the requirements set down in the ICD-9 
medical handbook for 309.81 (PTSD). 
b. Secondary Variables 
(1) d96_nightmares.  In our model a secondary dependent 
variable is defined as experiencing nightmares related to deployment.  The variable is 
binary, where having nightmares equals 1 and a score of 0 otherwise.  This variable is 
based on one of the four sub-questions of Question #12 on the DD Form 2796. 
(2) d96_avoid_situations.  A secondary dependent variable is 
defined as avoiding situations that trigger memories of trauma that occurred during 
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deployment.  The variable is binary, where avoiding situations equals 1 and a score of 0 
otherwise.  This variable is based on one of the four sub-questions of Question #12 on the 
DD Form 2796. 
(3)     d96_on_guard.  Another dependent variable is defined as 
being hyper-alert and borderline paranoia.  Service members who responded positively to 
this question are always searching for hidden danger regardless of the location.  The 
variable is binary, where being on guard equals 1 and a score of 0 otherwise.  This 
variable is based on one of the four sub-questions of Question #12 on the DD Form 2796. 
 (4) d96_detach.  A final dependent variable is defined as 
feeling emotionally detached from a loved one and society in general.  It is an inability to 
feel connected to anything or anybody not directly related to the traumatic experience.  
The variable is binary, where feeling detached equals 1 and a score of 0 otherwise.  This 
variable is based on one of the four sub-questions of Question #12 on the DD Form 2796. 
2. Explanatory Variables Defined 
a. Current Deployment / Deployment History Variables 
These explanatory variables are critical in the analysis of this data set as 
we examine whether current deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan (GWOT) have a 
different impact on rates of PTSD compared to previous deployments.  Another factor 
that we will examine is whether hostile or non-hostile has an impact on rates of PTSD.  
Finally we also look at whether duration of deployments has an influence. 
(1) GWOT.  This variable is defined as a current deployment 
that corresponds with the beginning of the Global War on Terror, specifically the 
beginning of OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM in March 2003.  The variable is binary, 
where being deployed from April 2003 onward equals 1 and a score of 0 indicating 
deployment prior to April 2003.  This variable is expected to have a positive sign on the 
partial effect. 
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(2) HOSTILE_DEPLOYMENT.  This variable is defined as 
a current deployment to a hostile zone.  The variable is binary, where being deployed in a 
hostile environment equals 1 and a score of 0 indicating a current non-hostile 
deployment.  This variable is expected to have a positive sign on the partial effect. 
(3) DEPLOYONCE36.  This variable is defined as having 
deployed at least once in the past 36 months.  This variable makes no distinction between 
hostile and non-hostile deployments.  It examines the deployment history for each 
observation to determine if any differences with current deployments are significant.  The 
variable is binary with a positive response equals 1 if deployed at least once (hostile or 
non-hostile) in past 36 months; 0 otherwise.  This variable is expected to have a positive 
sign. 
(4)  CURR_DEP_DURATION.  This variable describes the 
length of current deployments in terms of total days deployed.  There are three individual 
variables that comprise this grouping:  CURR_DEP_DUR60 are those sailors who have 
deployed from 1-60 days.  CURR_DEP_DUR180 are those who have deployed from 60-
180 days and CURR_DEP_MORE180 are those with more than 180 days of deployment.  
Each is binary with a positive response equals 1 if deployed for the specified duration; 0 
otherwise.  This variable is expected to have a positive sign. 
(5) HOST_DEP_DURATION36.  This variable describes the 
length of hostile deployments in terms of total days deployed over the course of the past 
36 months.  There are three individual variables that comprise this grouping:  
HOST_DEP_DUR60 are those sailors who have deployed from 1-60 days.  
HOST_DEP_DUR180 are those who have deployed from 60-180 days and 
HOST_DEP_MORE180 are those with more than 180 days of deployment in the past 36 
months.  Each is binary with a positive response equals 1 if deployed for the specified 
duration; 0 otherwise.  This variable is expected to have a positive sign.   
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b. Demographic Variables 
 (1)  Gender (MALE, FEMALE).  Males will be the control 
group and excluded from the actual regression.  Females are represented in both enlisted 
and officer data sets.     
  (2)  Race (WHITE, BLACK, RACE_OTHER).  The 
variables for race are binary and consist of WHITE, BLACK, and RACE_OTHER.  
White observations are the predominant race, especially among officers.  WHITE is the 
control group for the regressions.  Black naval personnel are the next category of race.  
The remaining sailors were all other races and were grouped together to simplify the 
analysis.  These variables are binary.     
  (3)   Marital Status (SINGLE, SINGLE_DEP, MARRIED).  
The overwhelming majority of enlisted sailors are single and therefore SINGLE (with no 
dependents) is the control group for the regressions.  All three categories are binary.  The 
variable SINGLE_DEP is defined as single sailors who have dependent children in one 
form or another (single parent, divorced and sharing custody, etc.).  The MARRIED 
variable includes both traditional couples (one service member, one civilian) and jointly 
married couples (both service members are in the Navy). 
  (4)   YOS.  Years of service are a continuous variable and are 
measured in years.  It was calculated by taking the Pay Entry Basic Date (PEBD) data 
from the DMDC data set and subtracted from the date that the dataset was extracted on. 
  (5) Education (HSG, BACHELORS, MASTERS 
OTHER_EDCREDS).  This variable is binary for all four categories and differs slightly 
in the officer and enlisted data sets.  In order to be qualified for commission officers must 
be a high school graduate.  Therefore this category was eliminated from the officer 
analysis.  The control group for officers was BACHELORS and HSG for enlisted.  The 
BACHELORS variable was defined as the observation having a four year undergraduate 
degree from an accredited college or university regardless of area of study.  The 
MASTERS variable includes all sailors with graduate degrees to include both Masters 
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and doctoral degrees.  The variable OTHER_EDCREDS refers to any education 
credentials other than those identified in the three other categories.  The intent is to 
simplify the analysis of this variable. 
  (6) RANK (JROFFICERS, FGOFFICERS, WARRANTS, 
E1E4_RANK, E5-E7_RANK, E8-E9_RANK).  All variables are binary.  The control 
group for the officer data set is JROFFICERS as they make up the majority of the 
sample.  The control group for the enlisted data set is E1E4_RANK as they represent the 
majority in the sample.  These variables were defined as the rank the observation holds at 
the time that the data was collected from DMDC. 
B. ANALYTICAL METHOD 
1. Theoretical Model 
Due to the inherent shortcomings of the Linear Probability Model (LPM) which 
include intrinsic heteroskedasticity, predicted values are not constrained to be between 
zero and one, and the partial effect of any explanatory variable will be constant we will 
use a binary response model instead.  This alternative model to the LPM, the probit 
model, will be used which is nonlinear and will require maximum likelihood estimation.  
This maximum likelihood estimation is advantageous in that the heteroskedasticity is 
already accounted for because it is based on the distribution of the dependent variables 
given the explanatory variables.  The theoretical model is given as a function: 
0( )G xβ β+ , where 0 ( ) 1G z< <  
where:  G = is the standard cumulative distribution function (cdf) 
             ix = values of explanatory variables  
 - The cdf can be expressed as an integral in the probit model: 
    ( ) ( ) ( )
z
G z z v dvφ
−∞
= Φ ≡ ∫  
    where:   ( )zΦ  is the standard normal density 
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In general, the analysis will consist of looking at the effect of x  on ( 1 )P y x= .  
The coefficients of the explanatory variables only give the sign of the partial effect (either 
positive or negative).  The magnitude of the partial effects will depend on all of the 'x s . 
2. Model Specification 
The different models being used in the analysis are listed below.  A full 
description of each variable will be given in the next section of the chapter.  Although 
there will be five models listed each model is being run on both enlisted and officer naval 
personnel.  In the analysis chapter they will each be evaluated separately.  The base 
model that we will use is described below: 
0 1 1 2 2( 1 )P y x X Xβ β β= = + +  
where X1 = deployment and deployment history data 
where X2 = demographic data and rank 
The vector X1 will change in each model.  The differences will be listed 
and defined.  The vector X2 will remain constant across the probit regression models for 
both officer and enlisted data sets. 
a. Probit Model Including (GWOT*Hostile Deployment) 
Interaction 
The first model we will use deals specifically with the effect that a current 
hostile deployment to the Global War on Terror has on the propensity to develop PTSD 
among naval personnel.  This model includes all demographic factors as well as an 
interaction term for the two variables that are being examined.  The deployment variables 
will include: 
GWOT = 0 if deployed prior to 4/2003; 1 if deployed after 4/2003 
HOST_DEP = 0 if deployed to a non-hostile zone; 1 to a hostile zone 
DEPLYONCE36 = 1 if deployed at least once (hostile or non-hostile) in 
past 36 months; 0 otherwise. 
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GWOT*HOST_DEP = interaction of two explanatory variables 
where X2 = demographic data and rank 
b. Probit Model Including (GWOT*Current Deployment Lengths) 
Interaction 
The second model we will use looks at current GWOT deployment 
duration lengths and examines what impact they have on propensity rates for developing 
PTSD among naval personnel.  The control group for deployment duration lengths is the 
sailors who have currently deployed from one to sixty days.  The second variable is the 
sailors who have currently deployed from 61 days to 180 days.  The third variable is for 
those sailors who have currently deployed for more than 180 days.  This model also 
includes all demographic factors (X2) as well as an interaction term for the two variables 
that are being examined.  The deployment variables will include: 
  CURR_DEP_DURATION = Control Group is CURR_DEP_DUR60,  
CURR_DEP_DUR180 and CURR_DEP_MORE180 will be included 
(variables are binary).  
GWOT*CURR_DEP_DURATION = interaction of two explanatory 
variables. 
c. Probit Model Including (GWOT*Hostile Deployments in Past 36 
Months) Interaction 
The third model we will use looks at hostile deployment duration lengths over the course 
of the past 36 months of our study and examines what impact they have on propensity 
rates for developing PTSD among naval personnel.  The control group for hostile 
deployment duration lengths is the sailors who have deployed to a hostile zone from one 
to sixty days in the past 36 months.  The second variable is the sailors who have deployed 
to a hostile zone from 61 days to 180 days in the past 36 months.  The third variable is for 




past 36 months.  This model also includes demographic factors as well as interaction  
terms for GWOT and all hostile deployments in the past 36 months.  The deployment 
variables will include: 
  HOST_DEP_DURATION36= Control Group is HOST_DEP_DUR60,  
HOST_DEP_DUR180 and HOST_DEP_MORE180 will be included 
(variables are binary)  
GWOT*HOST_DEP_DURATION36 = interaction of two explanatory 
variables. 
d. Probit Model Including DEPLOYONCE_HOST36 Variable 
The fourth model we will use looks at those soldiers who have deployed at 
least once to a hostile zone over the course of the past 36 months of our study and 
examines what impact this has on propensity rates for developing PTSD among naval 
personnel.  This model also includes all demographic factors as well as an interaction 
term for GWOT and the current deployment is hostile. The deployment variables will 
include: 
  DEPLOYONCE_HOST36= 1 if deployed at least once (hostile) in past  
36 months; 0 otherwise. 
e. Probit Model Including (GWOT*DEPLOYONCE_HOST36) 
Interactions 
The final model looks at multiple interactions between hostile deployment 
and GWOT, GWOT and whether the observation deployed at least once to a hostile area 
in the past 36 months, and between GWOT and whether the soldier has deployed at least 
once in the past 36 months regardless of whether the zone was hostile or non-hostile.  





(both hostile and total) has on propensity rates for developing PTSD among naval 
personnel and includes all demographic factors as well.  The deployment variables will 
include: 
GWOT*DEPLOYONCE_HOST36 = interaction of two explanatory 
variables. 
GWOT*DEPLOYONCE36 = interaction of two explanatory variables. 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided further details into the probit models that will be used 
to analyze the data sets.  It also provided the theoretical model that the probit models are 
based on.  The second section dealt with descriptions of both dependent and explanatory 
variables so there is a clear understanding of what is being compared and analyzed in the 
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VI. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
In this chapter we will examine results from various probit models examining the 
effects of current deployment and deployment history characteristics as well as 
demographics.  The purpose of the models is to determine the effect of repeated 
deployments and other deployment characteristics on the rate of PTSD among Navy 
veterans.  Secondary questions include identifying other potential risk factors for PTSD 
based on demographic and service characteristics.  A total of five models were built with 
the intent of separating out any coefficient estimates or group of coefficient estimates had 
a significant impact on the propensity to develop PTSD.  With probit models we will be 
looking at not only the coefficients to give us sign (positive or negative) and significance 
but also at the magnitude of the coefficient estimate’s effects.   
The five models being analyzed contain the same demographic and service 
information.  What separates these models is the deployment variable type, specifically in 
hostile versus non-hostile, pre-GWOT versus GWOT, and deployment duration.  In 
addition we will be analyzing the enlisted data set separately from the officer data set to 
ensure that one group does not corrupt the other group’s findings.  Both officers and 
enlisted will be analyzed using the probit models.  As a reminder, the models that will be 
examined are the following: 
• Model (1) with the effect that a current hostile deployment to the 
Global War on Terror has on the propensity to develop PTSD among 
naval personnel. 
• Model (2) looks at current GWOT deployment duration lengths and 
examines what impact they have on propensity rates for developing 
PTSD among naval personnel. 
• Model (3) analyzes hostile deployment duration lengths over the 
course of the past 36 months preceding the current deployment and 
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examines what impact they have on propensity rates for developing 
PTSD among naval personnel. 
• Model (4) looks at those sailors who have deployed at least once to a 
hostile zone over the course of the past 36 months preceding the 
current deployment and examines what impact this has on propensity 
rates for developing PTSD among naval personnel. 
• Model (5) examines multiple interactions between hostile deployment 
and GWOT, GWOT and whether the sailors deployed at least once to 
a hostile area in the past 36 months, and between GWOT and whether 
the sailors has deployed at least once in the past 36 months regardless 
of whether the zone was hostile or non-hostile. 
B. PROPENSITY TO DEVELOP PTSD MODELS 
1. Evaluation of Coefficients for Officer Data Set 
There were a total of five dependent variables and 25 independent variables for 
the officer data set.  There were a total of three of the ten demographic coefficient 
estimates that were statistically significant generally speaking according to our models.  
For the deployment/deployment history coefficient estimates there were only three of the 
fifteen that were found to be statistically significant for the naval officers.  These 
coefficient estimates will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  Table 12 will 
demonstrate Model (1), the base model, coefficients and significance levels.  Significant 
control coefficient estimates will only be discussed later in the chapter for Model (1) as 
they remain the same in each subsequent model. 
a. Model (1) Including Key and Control Variables 
The initial model that was analyzed looked at the effect that a current 
hostile deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan for the Global War on Terror has on the 
propensity to develop PTSD among naval officers.  This model was general in nature and 
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was meant to act as a base model where the subsequent models could be sub-divided into 
more specific deployment characteristics.  For officers currently deployed to GWOT  
  
Table 12.   Probit Model (1) for Naval Officers (Including Control Variables)     








































Model 1: GWOT*hostile deployment
* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%             
Deployed after GWOT
Hostile Deployment
Deployed at least once in 36 months 





this coefficient estimate was statistically significant at the .05 level.  The expected sign of 
the coefficient estimate was positive as anticipated.  The coefficients indicate that the 
average officer with service in GWOT may have a higher than normal propensity to 
develop PTSD than those who deployed prior to the beginning of GWOT although it 
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seems to be a relatively small difference.  The coefficient estimate for hostile deployment 
had a more statistically significant outcome at the .01 level.  The average naval officer’s 
probability of developing PTSD if deployed to a hostile zone has a 4.1 percentage point 
higher risk than those with deployments to a non-hostile zone.  The coefficient estimate 
that describes those officers who deployed at least once in 36 months prior to current 
deployment was not statistically significant in this model.  These findings are confirmed 
by previous studies (MHAT I-IV, 2006; King, D. W., King, L. A., Foy, D. W., Keane, T. 
M., & Fairbank, J. A., 1999; Riggs, D., Byrne, C.A., Weathers, F.W. & Litz, B.T., 1998) 
that hostile deployments are a major factor in the propensity to develop PTSD among 
active-duty servicemen. 
 The interaction coefficient estimate for GWOT and hostile deployment was also 
not significant.  This coefficient estimate was looking at whether a hostile deployment to 
GWOT was statistically different from those who had deployed prior to April 2003.  This 
result seems to indicate that for the average naval officer the particular campaign is not as 
relevant as whether it is hostile or not. 
 There were ten control variables of which only three were generally statistically 
significant for naval officers.  Being female was significant at the .01 level with a 
positive sign.  This finding indicates that for the average female naval officer the 
propensity to develop PTSD is higher than for males by 1.5 percentage points.  For the 
marital status control group single was the base group.  The coefficient estimate for 
married was also significant although at a lower .10 level.  For the officer data set the 
majority of the sample was married and could account for the significance.  The sign was 
positive although the magnitude of the difference was only 0.5 percentage points.  The 
coefficient estimate for singles with dependents was not significant.  For the rank control 
group the base group was junior officers in the grade of O1-O3.  The coefficient estimate 
for field grade officers was significant at the .05 level but the magnitude was very small 
at 0.6 percentage points.  The warrant officers coefficient estimate was not significant.  
When years of service were calculated, it was determined that this coefficient estimate 
was not significant.     
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b. Model (2) – Model (5) Key Variables  
In the following four models the deployment characteristics were further 
broken down into unique sub-groups.  The demographic data was left out of Table 13 in  
 
Table 13.   Probit Regression Models (2-5) for Naval Officers 


























(0.007)Standard Errors in parentheses
GWOT*Deployed at least once in 
36 months prior to current 
deployment








Deployed at least once in 36 
months prior to current deployment
GWOT*Hostile Deployment
Deployed at least once to hostile 
area in 36 months prior to current 
deployment
GWOT*Deployed at least once to 
hostile area in 36 months prior to 
current deployment
GWOT*Current Depl >180 days
Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 
months prior to current 
deployment
Hostile Deployment Duration 60-
180 days
Deployed at least once to hostile 
area in 36 months prior to current 
deployment
Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 
months prior to current 
deployment
Current Depl lasted 60-180 days
Current Depl lasted > 180 days
GWOT*Current Depl 60-180 
days
Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 
months prior to current deployment
Hostile Deployment
GWOT*Hostile Deployment
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%
Model 2:  GWOT*Current Deployment Lengths
Model 3:      GWOT*Hostile Deployments in 
Past 36 months
Model 4:  Deployonce_host36




order to focus on the primary independent variables.  The models were generally divided  
into deployment duration and hostile versus non-hostile deployments both currently and 
over the past 36 months. 
Model (2) looks at current GWOT deployment duration lengths and examines 
what impact they have on propensity rates for developing PTSD among naval personnel.  
In Model (2) none of the deployment coefficient estimates were statistically significant.  
This indicates that for the average officer that deployment length had little to no impact 
on the propensity to develop PTSD.  Even the interaction coefficient estimates that 
included deployment to GWOT did not produce any substantive difference. 
Model (3) analyzes hostile deployment duration lengths over the course of the 
past 36 months.  None of the deployment coefficient estimates were statistically 
significant.  The results are surprising in that for naval officers the length of deployments, 
even in hostile zones, did not have a significant effect on the propensity to develop 
PTSD.  For officers at least the data supports the findings that duration in hostile areas is 
not as significant a factor as other coefficient estimates.  The only coefficient estimate 
that had any significance was GWOT which has a positive sign but a magnitude of only 
0.8 percentage points at the .01 level.  
Model (4) looks at those officers that have deployed at least once to a hostile zone 
over the course of the past 36 months, to include GWOT.  This model does comparisons 
between those who have deployed to a hostile zone and those who have not.  The results 
of this model indicate that hostile deployments regardless of campaign title are significant 
factors in the propensity to develop PTSD.  Experiencing trauma is the key indicator of 
increasing PTSD rates as supported by this data.  The coefficient estimate for hostile 
deployment remains the most statistically significant at the .01 level with a positive sign 
and a magnitude of 4.1 percentage points.  Thus for the average naval officer the 
probability of developing PTSD increases by 4.1 percentage points if the current 
deployment was hostile compared to non-hostile deployment.  The coefficient estimate 
for GWOT was also significant at the .05 level with a positive sign.  For officers who 
have been deployed at least once in 36 months prior to current GWOT deployment the 
coefficient estimate was not significant in this model.  However, if an officer has been 
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deployed at least once to a hostile region during the 36-month look-back window, his 
probability of developing PTSD is lowered by 0.7 percentage points (p-value<0.01) 
compared to those who had not been deployed to a hostile region.   
Model (5) examines multiple interactions between hostile deployment and 
GWOT, GWOT and whether the officers deployed at least once to a hostile area in the 
past 36 months prior to current deployment, and between GWOT and whether the 
observation has deployed at least once in the past 36 months prior to current deployment 
regardless of whether the zone was hostile or non-hostile.  The results of this model again 
indicate that hostile deployments are the most significant factor in the propensity to 
develop PTSD with a positive sign and a magnitude of 4.1 percentage points (p-
value<0.01). Whether the deployment happens before or after GWOT does not change 
the probability of developing PTSD. 
2. Evaluation of Coefficients for Enlisted Sailors Data Set 
There were a total of five dependent variables and 25 independent variables for 
the enlisted data set.  There were a total of eight of the eleven demographic coefficient 
estimates that were statistically significant according to our models.  In general, for the 
deployment/deployment history coefficient estimates there were only eleven of the fifteen 
that were found to be statistically significant for sailors.  These coefficient estimates will 
be discussed in greater detail in the next section.  Table 14 will demonstrate Model (1), 
the base model, coefficients and significance levels.  Significant control variables will 
only be discussed later in the chapter for Model (1) as they remain the same in each 
subsequent model. 
a. Model (1) Including Key and Control Variables 
The initial model that was analyzed looked at the effect that a current 
hostile deployment to either Iraq or Afghanistan for the Global War on Terror has on the 
propensity to develop PTSD among sailors.  This was the base model again used to help 
sub-divide deployment characteristics into more specific groups.  The propensity to 
develop PTSD does not increase after the start of GWOT.  Table 14 shows that hostile 
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deployment was significant as expected at the .01 level.  The data results indicate that for 
the average sailor the propensity to develop PTSD increases by 4.6 percentage points if 
deployed to a hostile zone compared to deployment to a non-hostile zone.  For sailors  
 
Table 14.   Probit Model (1) for Enlisted Sailors (Including Control Variables)  
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* significant at 10% ** significant at 5%               
*** significant at 1%
Model 1: GWOT*hostile deployment
Standard Errors in parentheses
                                       
       
who had been deployed at least once during the preceding 36 months, there was also a 
positive sign and a .10 level of significance although the magnitude was quite small at 0.2 
percentage points.   
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The interaction term between GWOT and hostile deployment indicator was also 
statistically significant at the .01 level but the magnitude was only 0.9 percentage points.   
Thus compared to sailors who were deployed to hostile zone before GWOT, sailor 
deployed to a hostile area after GWOT starts has a higher propensity to develop PTSD by 
0.9 percentage points. 
 There were ten control coefficient estimates of which eight were statistically 
significant for sailors. This finding indicates that the female sailor has a higher 
probability to potentially develop PTSD than males by 1.4 percentage points.  For the 
race control group white was the base group.  The coefficient estimates for black and 
other races were significant at the .01 level but only had a magnitude of 0.7 percentage 
points each.  Education had little impact on the average sailor’s propensity to develop 
PTSD.  The only coefficient estimate that proved significant was those sailors who had 
alternate educational credentials compared to those sailors with a high school diploma.  
The coefficient estimate for other educational credentials was significant at the .01 level 
with a positive sign and a magnitude of only 0.9 percentage points.  In the marital status 
control group singles were the base group with well over 80 percent of the sample.  The 
coefficient estimate for married sailors was also significant although at a .01 level with a 
magnitude of 0.7 percentage points.  For the enlisted data set the majority of the sample 
was single.  The coefficient estimate for singles with dependents was not significant. 
 The rank and years of service coefficient estimates were significant and were 
negative in sign as expected.  It is reasonable to assume that as sailors increase rank and 
years of service their maturity and ability to cope with trauma and stress will improve 
thus lowering the propensity of these groups to develop PTSD.  The base group for rank 
was the junior sailors in the rank of E1-E4 who constituted a majority of the sample.  The 
coefficient estimate for junior NCOs (E5-E7) was significant at the .01 level and had a 
negative sign.  Thus for the average sailor in the rank of E5-E7 the probability that they 
would develop PTSD decreases by 1 percentage points compared to junior sailors in the 
ranks of E1-E4.  The coefficient estimate for senior NCOs (E8-E9) was also significant at 
the .01 level and had a negative sign.  Thus for the average sailor in the rank of E8-E9 the 
probability that they would develop PTSD compared to the junior sailors decreases by 1.7 
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percentage points.  Although statistically significant at the .01 level the coefficient 
estimate for years of service had a negligible magnitude of -0.1 percentage points.  Thus 
for the average sailor each additional year of service results in the probability of 
developing PTSD declines by 0.1 percentage points.        
b. Model (2) – Model (5) Key Variables 
In Table 15 the four models were again divided into unique sub-groups for 
the deployment characteristics.  The demographic data was left out of the models in order 
to focus on the primary independent variables.  The models were divided into deployment 
duration and hostile versus non-hostile deployments both currently and over the past 36 
months.   
Model (2) looks at current GWOT deployment duration lengths and 
examines what impact they have on propensity rates for developing PTSD among naval 
personnel.  In Model (2) several of the deployment coefficient estimates were statistically 
significant.  This indicates that for the average sailor that deployment length did have an 
impact on the propensity to develop PTSD.  Compared to sailors whose deployment 
duration is fewer than 30 days, those with longer duration has a higher probability to 
potentially develop PTSD (1.6 percentage points if duration is 60-180 days; 1.8 
percentage points if more than 180 days). Moreover, long deployment after GWOT starts 
increases the propensity to develop PTSD by 2.7 percentage points. This difference 
between officers where deployment lengths were not significant (Table 13) and enlisted 
sailors where it was (Table 15) could be explained by other factors to include the younger 
age of the average sailor compared to officers.  It could also perhaps be explained by the 
different tasks assigned on board the typical naval vessel.  The tasks of officers may in 
some manner have a mentally stimulating effect whereas the monotonous routine for the 
average sailor may increase the effect of a traumatic experience as the deployment gets 




Model (3) analyzes hostile deployment duration lengths over the course of the 
past 36 months.  These results were surprising in that the expected significance of hostile 
 
Table 15.   Probit Regression Models (2-5) for Enlisted Sailors 
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Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 
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Current Depl lasted 60-180 days
Current Depl lasted > 180 days
GWOT*Current Depl 60-180 
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Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 
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180 days
Model 3:      GWOT*Hostile Deployments in 
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Model 4:  Deployonce_host36
Model 5:  GWOT*deployonce_host36
Model 2:  GWOT*Current Deployment 
Lengths
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%  
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deployments combined with duration lengths overall did not occur.  The only coefficient 
estimate that was significant was the interaction term for those who deployed to GWOT 
and the hostile deployment duration was greater than 180 days.  This coefficient estimate 
had a positive sign at the .05 level, and it indicated that the probability of the average 
sailor developing PTSD increases by 1.4 percentage points if they are currently deployed 
to GWOT and they have been deployed in a hostile zone for more than 180 days compare 
those who have not met this criteria.  For sailors the data supports the overall findings 
that duration in hostile areas is not as significant a factor as other coefficient estimates.  
Concerns over deployment lengths by the Department of Defense may be overlooking the 
real reason for increasing rates of PTSD, which could be the number of times a active-
duty servicemen is exposed to trauma and battlefield horrors.    
Model (4) looks at those sailors who have deployed at least once to a hostile zone 
over the course of the past 36 months preceding the current deployment, to include 
GWOT.  The results of this model indicate that hostile deployments are significant 
factors in the propensity to develop PTSD.  Experiencing trauma is the key indicator of 
increasing PTSD rates as supported by this data.  The coefficient estimate on the variable 
for hostile deployment remains the most statistically significant at the .01 level with a 
positive sign and a magnitude of 4.6 percentage points.  Thus for the average sailor the 
probability of developing PTSD increases by 4.6 percentage points if the current 
deployment was hostile compared to a non-hostile deployment.  The coefficient estimate 
for GWOT was not significant.  The significance of deploying at least once in the 36 
months prior to the current deployment was also at the .01 level with a small magnitude 
of 0.5 percentage points.  The interaction coefficient estimate for GWOT and hostile 
deployment was significant at the .01 level with a positive sign and a magnitude of 0.9 
percentage points.  The findings of the coefficient estimate for deployed at least once to 
hostile area in 36 months prior to current deployment were unexpected since a positive 
sign was anticipated.  The findings were significant at the .05 level with a negative sign 
and a magnitude of 0.4 percentage points.  The coefficients indicate that for the average 
sailor the propensity to develop PTSD decreases by 0.4 percentage points if they have 
deployed at least once to a hostile zone within the 36 months prior to the current 
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deployment compared to those who have not deployed to a hostile zone.  This is 
contradicting the majority of the findings from the other models and past studies.  With 
the low percentage of the coefficient it does not lead to a strong argument against 
conventional wisdom concerning hostile deployments having a positive effect on 
propensity to develop PTSD.         
Model (5) examines multiple interactions between hostile deployment and 
GWOT, GWOT and whether the sailors deployed at least once to a hostile area in the 
past 36 months, and between GWOT and whether the sailor has deployed at least once in 
the past 36 months regardless of whether the zone was hostile or non-hostile.  The 
coefficient estimate for hostile deployment was the most statistically significant at the .01 
level with a positive sign and a magnitude of 4.6 percentage points.  The interaction 
coefficient estimate for GWOT and hostile deployment was significant at the .01 level 
with a positive sign and a magnitude of 0.9 percentage points.  
C. SECONDARY DEPENDENT VARIABLE MODELS 
1. Evaluation of Coefficients for Naval Officer Data Set 
There were a total of four secondary dependent variables for the officer data set.  
These variables will be discussed in greater detail.  Table 16 will demonstrate the first 
three models with coefficients and significance levels.  Control variables will not be 
discussed due to emphasis on deployment characteristics.  Table 17 will show the 
remaining two models. 
In Model (1) the findings indicate that the coefficient estimate for GWOT was 
significant at the .05 level only for the avoiding situations that reminded the officer of the 
deployment.  The sign was positive but the magnitude of the coefficient was only 0.7 
percentage points.  The coefficient estimate for hostile deployment as expected was 
found significant in all of the secondary dependent coefficient estimates at the .01 level.  
The coefficient estimate for being deployed at least once in 36 months prior to current 
deployment was also significant for being on guard (Dep. Var. 4) at the .05 level although 
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with a negative sign and a coefficient of only 0.5 percentage points.  The interaction 
coefficient estimate for GWOT and hostile deployment was not significant.   
   
Table 16.   Secondary Variables for Officers (Models 1-3) 
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0.002 0.007** -0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
-0.001 -0.003 -0.005** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
0.001 -0.004 0.007 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Model 2
0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.011
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
-0.002 -0.003 -0.007** -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.005 0.003 0.018** 0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
-0.008 -0.002 0.012 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009)
-0.005 0.003 -0.003 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
0.032 0.023 0.038 0.039
(0.022) (0.020) (0.028) (0.025)
Model 3
0.006* 0.006** 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.002 -0.004 -0.008** -0.001
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
-0.003 -0.011* -0.008 -0.007
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
0.029 0.012 0.031 -0.004
(0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.011)
0 0.018 0.004 0.012
(0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012)
-0.017*** -0.007 -0.018*** -0.007
(0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.010)
Observations 10361
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%
Standard Errors in parentheses
Hostile Deployment Duration 60-180 days
Hostile Deployment Duration >180 days
GWOT*Hostile Deployment Duration 60-
180 days
GWOT*Hostile Deployment Duration >180 
days
GWOT*Current Depl 60-180 days
GWOT*Current Depl >180 days
Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 months prior to 
current deployment
Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 months prior to 
current deployment
Current Depl lasted 60-180 days
Current Depl lasted > 180 days
Deployed after GWOT
Hostile deployment





In Model (2) the coefficient estimate for being deployed at least once in 36 
months prior to current deployment was significant for being on guard at the .05 level 
with a negative sign and a 0.5 percentage point coefficient.  The coefficient estimate for 
being currently deployed for 60-180 days was also significant at the .05 level with a 
positive sign.  Thus for the average officer the probability of constantly feeling on guard 
increases by 1.8 percentage points for those who have currently deployed from 60-180 
days compared to those officers who deployed less than 60 days. 
The results for Model (3) include significance of the coefficient estimate GWOT for a 0.6 
percentage points increase in the propensity to have nightmares and avoiding situations 
that remind the average officer who has deployed to GWOT of the deployment trauma.  
The results for the coefficient estimate for being deployed at least once in 36 months 
prior to current deployment was significant at the .05 level with a negative sign.  This 
coefficient could be constructed given the small percentage of officers who were positive 
for both coefficient estimates.  A hypothesis would be that for those officers in Special 
Operations, Medical Service, and other specialty assignments that these individuals are 
more likely to be mentally prepared for hostile deployments.  This argument is supported 
by Grossman who believes that there will always be 2 percentage points of a population 
that tends to gravitate towards these life-threatening assignments and have the ability to 
turn their emotional mechanisms off and on dependent on the situation (1995). 
Model (4) is shown on Table 17.  With a significance at the .05 level and a 
positive sign the coefficient estimate for GWOT indicates a 0.7 percentage points 
increase in the propensity to avoid situations that remind the average officer who has 
deployed to GWOT.  The coefficient estimate for hostile deployment was found 
significant in all of the secondary dependent coefficient estimates at the .01 level.  The 
remaining coefficient estimate that was statistically significant was for those deployed at 





negative sign was unexpected but again may be attributed to different branches or jobs 
that are outside the scope of this thesis.   
 
Table 17.   Secondary Variables for Officers (Models 4-5) 
 
Probit Models
(2)                
Have 
Nightmares








0.002 0.007** -0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
0.029*** 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
0.001 -0.004 0.007 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
-0.003 -0.002 -0.006** -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Model 5
0.004 0.005 -0.007 0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
0.030*** 0.028*** 0.043*** 0.033***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
0.004 -0.005 -0.007 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
0.001 -0.003 0.008 -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
-0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.010*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
-0.001 -0.001 -0.007 0.011
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
-0.004 0.006 0.009 0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 10361
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%
Standard Errors in parentheses
GWOT*Hostile Deployment
Deployed at least once to hostile area in 36 
months prior to current deployment
GWOT*Deployed at least once to hostile 
area in 36 months prior to current 
deployment
GWOT*Deployed at least once in 36 months 
prior to current deployment
Deployed at least once to hostile area in 36 
months prior to current deployment
Deployed after GWOT
Hostile Deployment
Deployed at least once in 36 months prior to 
current deployment
Deployed after GWOT






For model (5) the coefficient estimate for hostile deployment was found 
significant in all of the secondary dependent coefficient estimates at the .01 level with 
positive signs.  For the average officer a hostile deployment compared to a non-hostile 
deployment increased the probability of having nightmares by 3 percentage points, 
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avoiding situations by 2.8 percentage points, being on guard 4.3 percentage points, and 
feeling detached 3.3 percentage points.   
2. Evaluation of Coefficients for Enlisted Sailors Data Set 
There were a total of four secondary dependent variables for the enlisted data set.  
These variables will be discussed in greater detail.  Table 18 will demonstrate the first 
three models with coefficients and significance levels.  Control variables will not be 
discussed due to an emphasis on deployment characteristics.  Table 19 will show the 
remaining two models.   
In Model (1) the findings indicate that the coefficient estimate for GWOT was 
significant at the .05 level only for having nightmares and the .01 level for being on 
guard.  The sign was negative but the magnitude of the coefficient was only 0.3 
percentage points and 0.5 percentage points respectively.  The coefficient estimate for 
hostile deployment as expected was found significant in all of the secondary dependent 
coefficient estimates at the .01 level.  The coefficient estimate for those who deployed at 
least once in the 36 months prior to current deployment was also significant at the .05 
level and had a positive effect with a magnitude of 0.3 percentage points.  The interaction 
coefficient estimate for GWOT and hostile deployment was significant for every 
secondary dependent coefficient estimate except feelings of detachment.   
In Model (2) the coefficient estimate for GWOT was significant for having 
nightmares at the .10 level with a negative sign.  The magnitude was fairly small at 0.8 
percentage points.  Those deployed at least once in 36 months prior to current 
deployment were also significant for having nightmares at the .10 level with a positive 
sign and a 0.2 percentage point coefficient.  The coefficient estimates of current 
deployments have yielded significant results for enlisted sailors quite different from those 
among the officer population.   The coefficient estimate for current deployments lasting 
from 60-180 days was significant in all four dependent coefficient estimates and often at 
the .01 level while current deployments lasting more than 180 days was significant in 
three of four categories and was also significant at the .01 level with a positive sign.  
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Thus for the average sailor the probability of developing these four symptoms increased 
in general the longer the current deployment lasted. 
 
Table 18.   Secondary Variables for Enlisted Sailors (Models 1-3) 
 
Probit Models
(2)                
Have 
Nightmares









-0.003** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.046*** 0.027*** 0.061*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
0.003** 0.002 0.002 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.013*** 0.008** 0.018*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Model 2
-0.008* 0.003 -0.001 -0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
0.002* 0.001 -0.0005 -0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.009** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.008**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
0.007 0.017*** 0.012** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
-0.00005 -0.006 -0.012** 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
0.046*** 0.011* 0.049*** 0.013**
(0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Model 3
-0.002 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
0.001 -0.00005 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
-0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.0005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.003 -0.002 0.007 -0.0006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
0.006* 0.003 0.002 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.012* 0.01 0.009 0.009
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 96674 Standard Errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%
Hostile Deployment Duration 60-180 days
Hostile Deployment Duration >180 days
GWOT*Hostile Deployment Duration 60-180 days
GWOT*Hostile Deployment Duration >180 days
GWOT*Current Depl 60-180 days
GWOT*Current Depl >180 days
Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 months prior to 
current deployment
Deployed after GWOT
Deployed at least once in 36 months prior to 
current deployment
Current Depl lasted 60-180 days
Current Depl lasted > 180 days
Deployed after GWOT
Hostile deployment
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In Model (3) only two coefficient estimates proved to be significant.  When 
GWOT was joined with deployment lengths the result was significant.  For the 
interaction coefficient estimate GWOT and hostile deployments that lasted 60-180 days 
the results were significant at the .10 level with a positive sign.  This finding can be 
interpreted that the average sailor’s propensity to have nightmares increased if deployed 
to GWOT and to a hostile area for 60-180 days by 0.6 percentage points.  What is 
interesting is that this magnitude doubles for those sailors who deployed to both GWOT 
and to a hostile zone for more than 180 days.  The interaction coefficient estimate for 
GWOT and deployed to hostile area for more than 180 days was significant at the .10 
level and had a positive effect of 1.2 percentage points. 
Model (4) is shown on Table 19.  With significance at the .05 level for having 
nightmares and at the .01 level for being on guard with a negative sign the coefficient 
estimate for GWOT indicates a 0.3 percentage points and 0.6 percentage points decrease 
in the probability for the average sailor deployed to GWOT.  This finding can be 
explained that many of the sailors who deployed to GWOT were aboard ships and not 
subject to the same trauma as ground troops.  The coefficient estimate for hostile 
deployments as expected was found significant in all of the secondary dependent 
coefficient estimates at the .01 level.  Another coefficient estimate that was statistically 
significant was for those sailors deployed at least once to a hostile area in the 36 months 
prior to current deployment at the .01 level for nightmares and avoiding situations while 
at the .10 level for being on guard.  The interaction coefficient estimate for GWOT and 
hostile deployment was also significant at the .01 level for having nightmares and being 
on guard.  The results indicate that for the average sailor deployed to GWOT and in a 
hostile area the probability that they will have nightmares increase by 1.3 percentage 
points, avoiding situations will increase by 0.8 percentage points and being on guard 






once to a hostile area in the 36 months prior to current deployment was significant at the 
.05 level for avoiding situations and being on guard.  The signs were negative with 
relatively small effects. 
 
Table 19.   Secondary Variables for Enlisted Sailors (Models 4-5) 
 
Probit Models
(2)                
Have 
Nightmares









-0.003** -0.001 -0.006*** -0.0002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
0.046*** 0.027*** 0.061*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
0.005*** 0.005*** 0.003* .02***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.013*** 0.008** 0.018*** 0.0001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.003* -0.004** -0.004** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Model 5
-0.008*** -0.003* -0.008*** -0.005**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
0.045*** 0.027*** 0.060*** 0.023***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.014*** 0.008** 0.018*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.007** -0.007** -0.005* -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
0.005 0.005 0.003 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
0.005 0.001 0.001 0.008*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 96674 Standard Errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%
GWOT*Hostile Deployment
Deployed at least once to hostile area in 36 months 
prior to current deployment
GWOT*Deployed at least once to hostile area in 
36 months prior to current deployment
GWOT*Deployed at least once in 36 months prior 
to current deployment
Deployed at least once to hostile area in 36 months 
prior to current deployment
Deployed after GWOT
Hostile Deployment
Deployed at least once in 36 months prior to 
current deployment
Deployed after GWOT




        
 
For Model (5) the coefficient estimate for hostile deployment was found 
significant in all of the secondary dependent coefficient estimates at the .01 level with 
positive signs.  For the average sailor a hostile deployment increased the probability of 
having nightmares by 3 percentage points, avoiding situations by 2.8 percentage points, 
being on guard 4.3 percentage points, and feeling detached 3.3 percentage points.  
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GWOT also was a significant coefficient estimate in this model across all four dependent 
coefficient estimates.  The sign and magnitude of coefficients indicate that for average 
sailors the probability of developing these symptoms decreases with deployment to 
GWOT.  When combined into an interaction term the coefficient estimate for GWOT and 
hostile deployment was significant for three of the four dependent coefficient estimates.  
All signs were positive and significant at the .01 level for having nightmares and being on 
guard.  The coefficient estimate for being deployed at least once to a hostile area in the 36 
months prior to current deployment was significant for three of the four coefficient 
estimates although at lower levels of significance (.05 levels for nightmares and avoiding 
situations, .10 levels for being on guard).  The signs were all negative indicating that for 
the average sailor the probability of developing these symptoms decreases with at least 
one deployment to a hostile zone within the past 36 months compared to those without a 
hostile deployment in the past 36 months prior to current deployment. 
D. STUDY LIMITATIONS 
A potential problem with these two data sets from DMDC and AMSA is that there 
is potential for introducing measurement error bias into our models because of variables 
that are not interpreted the same way across the sample.  It is highly probable that many 
of the sailors who deployed in support of GWOT but served offshore in the Persian Gulf 
counted the deployment as non-hostile.  There are also probably sailors who deployed on 
land to Kuwait or Qatar and counted the tour as non-hostile since they were not 
physically in Iraq.  There is also reason to suspect that many of the responses to the DD 
Form 2796 were filled out with the intention to deceive health-care workers to avoid 
either stigma or delaying redeployment.   
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we examined results from various probit models that looked at the 
effects of current deployment and deployment history characteristics as well as 
demographics.  The purpose of the models was to determine the effect of repeated 
deployments and other deployment characteristics on the rate of PTSD among Navy 
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personnel.  Secondary questions include identifying other potential risk factors for PTSD 
based on demographic and service characteristics.  The findings from these models seem 
to indicate that, as expected, officers and enlisted naval personnel are distinct and must be 
considered separately for each of the models.  Deployment duration had little impact on 
officers but considerable impact on enlisted sailors, especially in hostile areas.  Hostile 
deployments had the largest overall effect on both officers and enlisted in increased 
propensity to develop PTSD.  Whether deployed currently or over the past 36 months 
made little difference unless it was to a hostile area. 
The next chapter will provide conclusions and policy recommendations based on 
the findings from this study.  Some of these recommendations may be unique to naval 
















VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a type of anxiety disorder that has 
tremendous impacts on the mental stability of those involved in the Global War on 
Terrorism.  This study, although very narrow in scope, has provided some information 
about the potential rates of PTSD in sailors after multiple deployments to Iraq or 
Afghanistan as well as the impact of increased tour lengths on those rates.  These findings 
can offer further support for the mental health of our veterans being a priority for further 
study with emphasis on treatment or preventative measures.   
The primary research question was to analyze the effect of repeated deployment 
and other deployment characteristics on the rate of PTSD among Navy veterans.  The 
first finding of interest is that officers and enlisted sailors have different factors that affect 
their propensity to develop PTSD.  Certainly the fact that enlisted sailors tend on average 
to be younger, single and just high-school-educated sets them apart from officers.  The 
officers on average tend to be older at entry into the military, have higher educational 
achievement and also tend to be married.  All of these factors contribute to the different 
effects of the deployments for officers and enlisted sailors.  Across both groups, however, 
female personnel had a slightly higher propensity to develop PTSD than their male 
counterparts.  Another interesting demographic finding is that education had little to no 
bearing for either group in determining PTSD rates.  The only exception is for other 
educational credentials which had a 0.9 percentage point increase in the probability of 
developing PTSD compared to a sailor with a high school diploma. 
Rank also had some interesting findings from the data analysis.  For naval officers 
being a Field Grade (O4-O6) compared to being a junior officer (O1-O3) increased the 
probability of developing PTSD by 0.6 percentage points which may be indicative of the 
higher stress on this group coming from being commanders of vessels during wartime.  
Senior rank had just the opposite effect on enlisted sailors.  Sailors are less likely to 
develop PTSD the more senior they are in terms of rank.  Thus for the average sailor in 
  76
the rank of E5-E7 the probability that they would develop PTSD decreases by 1 
percentage point compared to junior sailors (E1-E4).  The variable for senior NCOs (E8-
E9) was also significant at the .01 level and had a negative sign.  Thus for the average 
sailor in the rank of E8-E9 the probability that they would develop PTSD decreases by 
1.7 percentage points compared to that of junior sailors (E1-E4).         
The one deployment characteristic that stands alone in its impact on PTSD rates, 
regardless of being officer or enlisted is that of being deployed to a hostile area.  
Significant at the .01 level across all models for both data sets, it should come as no 
surprise that hostile deployments are certain to produce traumatic events that increase the 
probability of developing PTSD.  For officers the duration of deployments did not seem 
to be a significant factor overall in determining the propensity for PTSD.  However, if an 
officer has been deployed at least once to hostile region during the prior 36 months, the 
probability of developing PTSD is lowered by 0.7 percentage points (p-value<0.01).  
This is important in that it may be illustrating a self-selection—that those who endure 
hostile deployment well will tend to be mentally prepared for another hostile deployment.  
Compared to sailors whose deployment duration is fewer than 30 days, those with 
longer duration have a higher probability to potentially develop PTSD (1.6 percentage 
points if duration is 60-180 days; 1.8 percentage points if more than 180 days). 
Moreover, having a long deployment after GWOT started increased the propensity to 
develop PTSD by 2.7 percentage points. This difference between officers where 
deployment lengths were not significant and enlisted sailors where it was could be 
explained by other factors to include the younger age of the average sailor compared to 
officers.  It could also perhaps be explained by the different tasks assigned on board the 
typical naval vessel.  The tasks of officers may in some manner have a mentally 
stimulating effect whereas the monotonous routine for the average sailor may increase the 
effect of a traumatic experience as the deployment gets longer in duration.  Further 
research is recommended with a breakdown by job descriptions. In other studies on the 
GWOT that the Army conducted, combat soldiers (infantry, armor) tend to have higher 
rates of PTSD than non-combat specialties.  It would be useful to determine if there are 
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naval specialties with a higher propensity to develop PTSD so that naval mental health 
providers could concentrate on preventative measures for those at a higher risk.  
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS   
There are several recommendations to be made based on the literature review and 
the data analyzed in this study.  The first is that further research into the causes and 
effects of PTSD on combat veterans needs to remain a focus within the Department of 
Defense.  Our society cannot afford to ignore the potential long-term damage that PTSD 
can cause.  The struggling veterans of the Vietnam war are ample proof of the effects that 
untreated PTSD can cause between the high suicide rates and homelessness.  
Deployment duration seems to be significant for the enlisted force.  Continued 
efforts at minimizing deployment length must obviously remain secondary to military 
effectiveness.  However, understanding that prolonged tours have a detrimental effect on 
the mental health of our military is essential in attempts to minimize the damage being 
done.  As opportunities arise the need to shorten deployment lengths is the key in 
retaining a mentally healthy fighting force. 
Although the actual percentage of naval personnel with the propensity to develop 
PTSD is relatively small it should not be discounted when added to the entire Department 
of Defense structure.  The Marine Corps and the Army have significantly higher PTSD 
rates and these recommendations are applicable cross-service. 
Perhaps the most important recommendation is to expand the scope and duration 
of the DD Form 2796.  It must be administered several times over the course of at a 
minimum of a year after deployment to help identify those whose symptoms manifest 
longer after the deployment ends.  The current timing of when the form is administered 
undermines the validity of any mental health findings.  Desire in avoiding anything to 
potentially delay redeployment is paramount in most service member’s mind.   
As more data continues to be gathered during the Global War on Terrorism it is 
essential to continue to identify trends and potential populations that need to be isolated 
and given priority for mental health services.  While AMSA is the repository for all DD 
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Form 2796 and other deployment data it should be noted that many veterans use 
TRICARE services to avoid the potential stigma associated with mental disorders.  
TRICARE data as well as from the Veterans Affairs should be gathered by Department of 
Defense analysts for trends among those seeking mental health services outside of 
military facilities.  Under-reporting of this issue is significant given survey-based data 
due to the associated stigma.  Additional research by linking deployment information 
with actual medical records from TRICARE and the VA would be extremely useful in 
conjunction with the AMSA data in determining true rates of PTSD for those seeking 
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